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THE motor carrier industry of today has progressed far from its
meager beginnings during World War I. Successfully resisting railroad
efforts to stunt its growth, it has assumed within the past decade a
position of substantial importance and has been largely responsible for
returning transportation as a whole to a competitive pattern. Through-
out its development motor carriage has displayed two distinctive char-
acteristics. Intense competition between numerous small operators has
gone hand in hand with and partly contributed to the steady process of
unification of small carriers into somewhat larger units. More recently,
and notwithstanding the Motor Carrier Act of 1935 with its requirement
that combination transactions be "consistent with the public interest," 1
this unification trend has been proceeding at a constantly accelerated pace.
Large scale unification, however, with its need for large capital, has
been another matter. Investors have been slow to abandon their fear
of the turbulent uncertainties flowing from the severe competition in
motor carriage. The bus industry was more responsive than the truck
industry to the inducements of a large scale operation.2 Even before
1935 Greyhound had emerged as an important exception to the general
predominance of small-operators. Indeed, it was not until after the
enactment of the Motor Carrier Act of 1935 that carriage of freight
by motor truck appeared sufficiently stable to justify expansion and
to interest the capital market in financing that expansion. Lehman
Brothers led the way in 1937 by lending financial support to substantial
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1. 49 STAT. 543, 555 (1935), 49 U. S. C. §313(a) (1) (Supp. 1939) (hereinafter
cited as MOTOR CARRIER Acr).
2. 54th ANN. REP. I. C. C. (1940) 32. The legislative history of federal motor car-
rier regulation neatly illustrates the point. Early bills proposed regulation for both busses
and trucks. S. 1734, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. (1925), and H. R. 8266, 69th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1926). Subsequently, yielding to contentions made by trucking interests that the large
number of truck operators and their small size make efficient regulation impossible, bills
were introduced which limited regulation to the more completely organized bus industry.
S. 1252, 70th Cong., 1st Sess. (1927) ; H. R. 12380 and S. 3992, 70th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1928). Subsequently, other bills restricting regulation to busses were introduced into
Congress, and one of them, H. R. 10288, 71st Cong., 2d Sess. (1930), was passed by the
House. See Note 18 infra. See also JOHNSON, GOVERNMENT REGULATION oF TRANS-
PORTATION (1938) 572.
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acquisitions by Keeshin Transcontinental Freight Lines,' but the unim-
pressive record of this first experiment served to emphasize the risks
involved rather than to encourage large scale operation.4 Then in 1940,
with Kuhn-Loeb backing, came a second departure from financier hesi-
tation and a decision to assume the risks in a venture far greater than
that carried out in the Keeshin unification- the formation of the
Transport Company of New York. To picture the Transport Company
is to visualize a powerful unified corporation, combining 49 motor carrier
companies which owned 10,600 units of equipment and employed
9,700 persons, engaged in operating motor trucks over a web of routes
spun systematically upon the eastern seaboard from the Piedmont region
of the Carolinas into the heart of New England.' Conceived in terms of
profits and contemplating a public offering of securities, the Transport
Company was viewed with keen interest by the financial community and
the decision of the Interstate Commerce Commission as to whether the
transaction was "consistent with the public interest" was eagerly awaited.
Interest changed to enthusiasm and even exuberance after a generally
favorable report was proposed to the Commission by its Bureau of
Finance Examiner.' Rumors of new integrations sprang up the country
over, and at long last the motor carrier industry seemed about to enter
"big-time."
The Interstate Commerce Commission, however, thought otherwise.
Acknowledging that its decision would fix the pattern for future uni-
fication activity, it upset the generally favorable report with a positive
denial of authority on November 15, 1940.7 Unfortunately, neither the
majority opinion nor Commissioner Eastman's special concurrence, nor
both together, present a very lucid exposition of the Commission's
attitude toward large scale combination, for the opinions were written
3. Keeshin Transcon. Frt. Lines, Inc.-Control, 1 M. C. C. 317 (1936); Keeshin
Motor Exp. Co., Inc. (Illinois)-Leases, 1 M. C. C. 373 (1936); Keeshin Transcon.
Frt. Lines, Inc.-Control, 5 M. C. C. 25 (1937); Freight by Highway (Feb. 1936) 13
FORTUNE 47.
4. Keeshin Freight Lines, Inc.-Issuance of Notes, 35 M. C. C. 119 (1940).
5. The Transport Co.-Control, 36 M. C. C. 61 (1940). Of the 49 companies, 39
were over-the-road companies (12 being subsidiaries of the other companies), and 10
were rental companies.
6. The Transport Co.-Control, Proposed Report by J. Edward Davey, Chief,
Section of Finance, Bureau of Motor Carriers, Oct. 11, 1940 (mimeographed).
7. The Transport Co.-Control, 36 M. C. C. 61 (1940). One of the most peculiar
aspects of the Transport case was the conspicuous absence of railroad opposition. No
certain guess at railroad motivation is possible, but this statement appeared in an edi-
torial in the motor truck trade journal: "It has been rumored the railroads are pulling
for the combine because it would place a niajor part of their competition under one
management. Competitive practices could then be wzatched far more easily than is now
possible. And their theory is that the bankers have called off railroad opposition." Trans-
port Topics, July 22, 1940, Vol. 14, No. 43, p. 4.
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in terms of the narrow rather than the broad issues. Four principal
reasons were set forth for holding the Transport Company's application
not consistent'with the public interest: (1) unconvincing evidence of
resulting economies, (2) possible undesirable elimination of motor carrier
competition, (3) failure to simplify corporate structure, and (4) exces-
sive consideration to vendors and immoderate fees to promoters.
While an over-all consideration of these four reasons seems necessary
to explain the result reached in the Transport case, an independent eval-
uation of each is essential in any attempt to grasp the Commission's
policy toward large scale unification. The possibility of effecting
economies and improving service by integrated operation was carefully
appraised in the Examiner's report and found persuasive. The Com-
mission, however, was unimpressed and apparently even uninterested,
for the case for economies was set forth but neither analyzed nor criti-
cized and served no purpose other than to provide an unnecessary preface
to this cavalier conclusion:
"In the absence of evidence that similar consolidations or expan-
sioms of. operations on such a large scale have produced results
anticipated by applicant, the testimony with respect to proposed
economies and improvements in service is not convincing."'8
Strictly interpreted and carefully observed, this dogmatism would bar
unifications upon a scale more extensive than those now being success-
fully operated. Skepticism of optimistic estimates of economies is under-
standable, especially since expansions by Keeshin Transcontinental Freight
Lines had portended similar savings which failed to materialize.' But
to substitute for articulate analysis a rule of thumb which, if consistently
applied, would freeze motor carrier operation at its present level is hardly
understandable.
The Examiner's report, after an effort to uncover any undesirable
elimination of motor carrier competition, found that numerous and
strong competing carriers would continue to render service throughout
the regions to be served by the Transport Company." The Commission
again found to the contrary. Although it conceded that substantial motor
carrier competition would remain in most of the New England and
Middle Atlantic sections, it was "left in doubt" as to whether such com-
petition would exist on traffic moving between southern points and points
8. The Transport Co.-Control, 36 M. C. C. 61, 78. (Italics supplied).
9. Keeshin Frt. Lines, Inc.-Issuance of Notes, 35 M. C. C. 119 (1940).
10. See Davey, note 6 supra at 61-69. The motor carriers which would provide the
Transport Company with competition were analyzed according to area served, and it was
found that there would continue to be competition from 168 carriers, 56 of them Class I,
in New England, 182 carriers, not segregated according to classes, in New York State,
"several hundred" carriers between New York and Washington, and 90 carriers, 24 of
them Class I, in the Southern region.
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north of Baltimore. Commissioner Eastman demurred to this reserva-
tion, and suggested that attention should be shifted from motor carrier
competition remaining within the area to other factors operating to
prevent monopoly such as competition from railroads and private truckers,
and issuance of new certificates of public convenience and necessity.
The Transport Company, anticipating Commission disapproval of its
complex corporate structure with many subsidiaries rendering duplicate
services within the same areas, filed supplemental applications proposing
to effect singleness of title in Transport itself. But no specific plan for
this simplification was presented, and the Commission refused to issue
carte blanche authority for later merger or consolidation. Expressing
doubt as to its own power to compel later adoption of a desirable plan
to accomplish this object, the Commission chose to treat the case as if
no singleness of title had been promised, and accordingly found the
maintenance of multiple corporations engaged in substantially duplicate
operations uneconomical and contrary to the public interest."
The strongest objections of the Commission, however, were apparently
leveled at the two defects of finance: excessive consideration for the
carrier properties to be acquired and exorbitant fees for promotion, with
neither the vendors nor the promoters retaining any considerable stake
in the enterprise. The total consideration of over $22,500,000, largely
cash, was 2. 12 times the value of the tangible assets to be acquired,
8.81 times the adjusted net income of the vendors in 1939, and 24.62
times their average net income for the three years 1937-1939.' " Yet in
the industry a ratio of 6 times net earnings is ordinarily considered
indicative of sound value in acquisitions. 3 The unification transaction
also contemplated the payment of cash commissions approximating
$1,225,000 to the underwriters for negotiating the public sale of Trans-
port Company's preferred and common stock, and the issuance of addi-
tional common stock valued at $2,200,000 to the promoters for their
services, presumably to be eventually sold to the public. 4 Organization
11. The Transport Co.-Control, 36 M. C. C. 61, 86.
12. Id. at 90.
13. In his concurring opinion Commissioner Eastman said at 97: "There is much
evidence, quite comprehensive in character, leading to the conclusion that prospective
earning power will justify such a price. Yet the motor carrier industry is still in its
early youth, there is no background of experience by which the probable results of such a
unification as is proposed can be gauged, and transportation competition is now so intense
as to multiply the hazards of the future."
14. Id. at 90, 92. It was proposed that Transport Company should issue 100,000
shares of restricted common stock, par value of $1 a share, to Kuhn-Loeb & Company.
By issuing the stock with $1 par value it was possible to avoid the necessity of Com-
mission approval since the total par value was less than $500,000. Moron Cannzan Acr
§ 214. Yet the plan for the further issue of common stock subject to Commission approval
contemplated that it should have an actual value of at least $20 a share and that it should
be issued at that price notwithstanding its par value of $1 a share. The stock issued to
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expenditures were found to amount to only $200,000; yet the total cost
of financing was to exceed $3,000,000, or 14% of the total value of
Transport Company's capital stock. While the Examiner's report pro-
posed merely to reduce the promoters' commissions to 10% of the
capital stock value, leaving underwriting commissions the same, no such
halfway measure was satisfactory to the Commission which stated flatly:
"We believe that unifications of motor carriers are more likely to
be on a sound basis, and the prospects of ultimate success improved,
if they be brought about through the initiative, and negotiations
between the carriers involved, or between persons financially inter-
ested in such carriers who retain a substantial interest in the enter-
prise, without the use of holding company devices or the intervention
of promoters, particularly where such intervention would substan-
tially increase ultimate costs."' 5
The Transport case is undoubtedly the most important decision in-
volving motor carrier unification rendered by the Commission tinder
the Motor Carrier Act of 1935. In one form or another it involves
virtually every problem with which the Commission has struggled. In
addition, it dramatically presents the controversy over large as against
small scale operation.'0 But a resolution of this conflict was certainly
not reached in this case. The broad question of the proper position of
the large company in the motor carrier field went unmentioned, and
questions of economy in large scale operation and permissible considera-
tion for intangible assets were unsatisfactorily handled. The result and
some of the language used, if accepted literally, would almost destroy
the prospect of large scale combination. Yet there are reasons to believe
that the Transport case does not represent a drastic departure from the
underlying policy of the Motor Carrier Act to foster controlled inte-
Kuhn-Loeb would then likewise acquire a value of $20 or more per share and presumably
be marketable at that price or better. Commissioner Eastman reviewed the scheme, and
then stated at 99: "This arrangement is a shrewd device for insuring the desired compen-
sation for promoters and bankers without bringing it under our supervision. We should
not approve such a plan."
15. The Transport Co.-Control, 36 M. C. C. 61, 92.
16. "An important reason for the success which motortrucks have often had in com-
peting with the railroads for various types of traffic has been the great flexibility of motor-
truck service and its ability to adjust itself readily to the special needs of the shipper.
There are those who feel that when motortruck operations conducted under a single man-
agement increase beyond a certain size there is a tendency to sacrifice this advantage of
flexibility, because of the fact that contact with the shipper must more and more be
maintained through subordinates acting under instructions. It is possible that for this
and other reasons there is a limit to increase in efficiency with increase in size of motor-
truck operations and that beyond this limit efficiency tends to decrease. However, only
actual experience can determine this, and from that point of view the test of large-scale
operations which applicant is making is desirable." Keeshin Transcon. Frt. Lines, Inc.-
Control, 5 M. C. C. 25, 35 (1937). See also Nelson, Economics of Large Scale Opera-
tion in the Trucking Industry (1941) 17 J. oF LAND & PUB. UrxL. ECON. 112.
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gration and restrict ruthless competition on the theory that economies
and improved service result from large scale operation. The financial
aspects of the transaction bore many of the earmarks of an anachronistic
promotion belonging more properly in an earlier era of American
finance. Particularly relevant was Commissioner Eastman's caveat sug-
gesting that if the vendors and promoters had been willing to accept
and hold stock instead of cash, thereby taking "pot-luck" with the public
in sharing the risks of the enterprise, the transaction might have been
approved. In other words, it is possible that the Commission primarily
sought to preclude the establislment of a tradition of lusty finance in
motor carriage, and the balance of the opinion was mainly "window
dressing." This hypothesis will soon be tested in some measure, since
seven of the over-the-road companies involved in the Transport case,
together with seven of their subsidiaries, have applied for authority to
combine into a single concern, which, in terms of total consideration
and net income, will be almost half the size of the Transport Company
and will afford truck service from New England to Florida.17 The
financial arrangements of this new unification were specifically drawn to
meet the Commission's objections in the Transport case. All the nego-
tiations were conducted by the truck operators themselves, who as vendors
plan to take stock in the new company in return for their properties.
No public financing is to be undertaken except a small offering of pre-
ferred stock to obtain working capital, and promotional fees are to be
wholly eliminated. Thus, it seems very certain that in the near future
the Commission will be compelled to state more clearly its views on large-
scale unification. In any event the time seems ripe for an appraisal of
motor carrier unification and a general examination of Commission
activity in the field prior to and since the Transport case.
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF REGULATED UNIFICATION
Federal regulation of motor carriers in general, and without specific
reference to unification, was first demanded early in the 'twenties as
17. The transaction takes the form of an acquisition of control of the stock of the
seven companies by a parent company, Associated Transport, Inc. The seven companies
involved are Barnwell Bros., Inc., Burlington, N. C.; Consolidated Motor Lines, Inc.,
Hartford, Conn.; Horton Motor Lines, Inc., Charlotte, N. C.; McCarthy Freight Sys-
tem, Taunton, Mass.; 1f. Moran Transportation Lines, Inc., Buffalo, N. Y.; South-
eastern Motor Lines, Inc., Bristol, Va.; and Transportation, Inc., Atlanta, Ga. In addi-
tion to north-south service, lines will extend west to Pittsburgh, Cleveland and New
Orleans. The seven companies operate 3,500 vehicles, have over 6,000 employees, and
in 1940 had total operating revenues and net income of $17,205,238 and 1350,327 respec-
tively. The total consideration of approximately $9,500,000 is to be allocated so that
each combining carrier receives an amount of 6% cumulative convertible $10 par pre-
ferred stock equal to 80% of its net worth, and an amount of common stock equal to 50%
of its net income from April, 1940, to April, 1941, after taxes and dividends. See Trans-
port Topics, June 16, 1941, Vol. 15, No. 38, p. 1.
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post-war diversion of rail traffic to motor carriers finally aroused the
slumbering railroads to a counter-offensive. Joining forces with those
who believed that unregulated interstate motor carriage was imperiling
effective state supervision, the railroads launched a serious campaign
for federal regulation in 1925.18 The fight was no blitzkricg. For ten
years no session of Congress was free from regulatory proposals; dozens
of bills were introduced, hearings were held, and one bill, limited to
bus regulation, passed the House. 9 In the depression following 1929
agitation became more intense, for railroad distress had become acute
and, moreover, motor carriers fared little better. The Interstate Com-
merce Commission, after study, supported federal regulation ;20 a
specially appointed Federal Coordinator of Transportation recommended
federal control;2 those within the motor carrier industry who hoped
regulation would provide a cure for too much competition added their
support ;22 and finally Presidential insistence upon legislation, as part of
a comprehensive plan of extending federal control to all transport
agencies, became more firm.2 1 Under such pressure a bill closely pat-
18. Twin bills were introduced into the first session of the 69th Congress, S. 1734
by Senator Cummins, 67 CONG. REc. 904 (1925) and H. R. 8266 by Representative Par-
ker, 67 CONG. REC. 2761 (1926). Although hearings were held on S. 1734 before the
Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce, to which the bill had been referred, neither
bill was reported out of the Committee. The Cummins-Parker bill was not the first
proposal made to Congress for the regulation of interstate motor carriage. In 1909 two
such bills were presented to the House: H. R. 1066, 61st Cong., 1st Sess. (1909), intro-
duced by Representative Olcott, 44 CONG. REc. 58 (1909), and H. R. 5176, 61st Cong.,
1st Sess. (1909), introduced by Representative Cocks, 44 CoN(G. REC. 390 (1909). Other
than these two surprisingly early proposals, however, no other bills preceded the Cum-
mins-Parker bill. For a brief picture of the background, see HEALY, THE EcoNomics
OF TRANSPORTATiON (1940) 426-30.
19. H. R. 10288, 71st Cong., 2d Sess., 72 CONG. REc. 6029 (1930). For a summary
of the various bills introduced into Congress, in their chronological order, see WAGNER,
A La IsLATiv_ HisToRy OF THE MOTOR CARRiER AcT, 1935 (1935) 93-100.
20. Motor Bus and Motor Truck Operation, 140 I. C. C. 685 (1928) ; Coordination
of Transportation, 182 I. C. C. 263 (1932). For various annual reports issued by the
Commission to Congress, see, e.g., 44th ANN. REP. I. C. C. (1930) 75; 45th ANN. Rrr.
I. C. C. (1931) 101.
21. Eastman, Report of Federal Coordinator of Transportation, SEN. Doc. No. 152,
73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934) ; Eastman, Report of Federal Coordinator of Transportation,
H. R. Doc- No. 89, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935).
22. See, e.g., Hearings Before Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce on S. 1734,
69th Cong., 1st Sess. (1926) ; Hearings Before House Committee on Interstate and For-
eign Conmnerce on H. R. 6836, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934); Hearings Before Senate
Committee on Interstate Commerce on S. 1629, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935).
23. On January 31, 1935, in a special message to Congress, President Roosevelt
stated that he would soon ask for general legislation centralizing the regulation of all
transportation agencies. N. Y. Times, February 1, 1935, p. 1, col. 7. In a "fireside-
chat" on April 28, 1935, the President proclaimed urgent need for the regulation of trucks
ad busses operating in interstate commerce. N. Y. Times, April 29, 1935, p. 1, col. 8.
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terned after one suggested by the Federal Coordinator and approved by
the Commission was enacted on August 9, 1935, to become the Motor
Carrier Act of 1935.
The unification provision of the Act, Section 213, entitled "Consoli-
dation, merger, acquisition and control," was modelled on paragraphs
(4) and (5) of the old Interstate Commerce Act, of which the Motor
Carrier Act became Part II. Section 213(a) set forth the permissible
methods of integration and Section 213(b) made those methods ex-
clusive. Explaining generally to the Senate the purposes of Section 213,
Senator Wheeler asserted that, although most truck operations were
small enterprises, there were rumors of expansions into sizeable systems,
and, in view of past experience with railroad and public utility unifica-
tions, it was thought necessary to control such developments where the
number of vehicles involved was sufficient to make the matter of more
than local importance. 24 The principle of supervised integration caused
no dispute and legislative differences were confined to details rather than
objectives. One accepted purpose was the protection of motor carriers
from railroad domination. As a safeguard, subsection (a) (1) provided
that in the ordinary combination of one motor carrier with another
motor carrier approval should be granted if the Commission found the
transaction "consistent with the public interest," but if the applicant was
a non-motor carrier, such as a railroad, or was a person controlled by
or affiliated with such a carrier, the prerequisite to Commission approval
was that the transaction "promote the public interest" by enabling the
applicant to use service by motor vehicle to public advantage in its opera-
tions, and avoid undue restraint of competition. -a
Aside from certain procedural improvements20 no major change was
made in the Motor Carrier Act of 1935 until September 18, 1940, when
This expressed need was formally presented to Congress in a message of June 7, 1935,
when the President requested the House to vote favorably on the bill already passed by
the Senate. N. Y. Times, June 8, 1935, p. 1, col. 6.
24. 79 CONG. REc. 5654-55 (1935).
25. The possibility of railroad absorption of motor carriage, to be fostered by regu-
lation by a "railroad minded" Commission, provided an oratorical bludgeon for the op-
ponents of regulation which was utilized by them during debate of all the proposals. That
the "railroad proviso" in § 213 was intended to provide protection against this possibility
is dear. Senator Wheeler, spealdng for the Committee on Interstate Commerce in ex-
plaining S. 1629, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935), stated: "With this limitation, it will b2
possible for the Commission to allow acquisitions which vill make for coordinated or
more economical service and at the same time protect the public against the monopoliza-
tion of highway carriage by rail, express, or other interests." 79 Co:.G. Rac- 5655 (1935).
See also a similar statement made to the House by Representative Sadowsli, 79 CoNC.
REc. 12206 (1935).
26. A bill providing amendments designed to improve and expedite administration,
H. R. 9739 (75th Cong., 3d Sess.), was introduced into the House on March 4, 1938,
83 CoNG. RnEc 2897 (1938). On June 16, 1938, the bill was presented to the President,
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the Transportation Act of 1940 became effective." In substance a
revision of the existing Interstate Commerce Act, the Transportation
Act of 1940 in its Part III extended Commission control to water car-
riers, while Parts I and II dealt as before with rail and motor carriers
respectively."8 A formal change was made in the unification provisions
by repealing Section 213 of the Motor Carrier Act and removing its
provisions to Section 5, Part I, of the Interstate Commerce Act, which
in turn was amended to cover unifications of all three types of carriers.
Moreover, alterations in language were made, for while Section 5 (2) (b)
like Section 213 (a)(1) requires unification transactions to be "con-
sistent with the public interest" the proviso against railroad domination
was changed slightly. Instead of retaining the requirement that the
transaction "promote" the public interest, the phrase "consistent with"
the public interest was substituted, but in such a way as to retain
the very same meaning.29 Thus Section 5 (2) (b) preserves the guaranty
of Section 213 (a) (1) against railroad control of motor carriage except
83 CoNG. REc. 9707 (1938), and approved on June 29, 1938 to become Pub. L. No. 777,
75th Cong., 3d Sess., 52 STAT. 1236 (1938), 49 U. S. C. §§303-24 (Supp. 1939).
Among the amendments enacted, § 213(b) (1) was changed so as to correct an over-
sight and to specifically include plural acquisitions between motor carriers and other
carriers. Of more importance, the mandatory hearing provision for unification cases was
changed so as to permit the elimination of hearings unless the Commission should find
a hearing necessary to determine whether or not the findings made by the examiner or
joint board were properly made. It was also provided that § 213(b) (2) be amended so
as to explicitly include general enforcement remedies as well as the hearing and orders
provided in that subsection.
27. Pub. L. No. 785, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. (Sept. 18, 1940).
28. Part I of the Interstate Commerce Act now encompasses §§ 1-27, Part II, §§ 201-
27, and Part III, §§ 301-23. As to Part III, see Comment, Regulation of Water Car-
riers (1941) 50 YALE L. J. 654. Provisions contained in Part I will hereinafter be cited
as the Interstate Commerce Act.
29. The Motor Carrier Act, § 213, had required that the proposal will "promote the
public interest by enabling such carrier to use service by motor vehicle to public advan-
tage in its operations and will not unduly restrain competition," while now § 5 of the
Interstate Commerce Act requires a finding that the transactions will be "consistent with
the public interest and will enable such carrier to use service by motor vehicle to pub-
lic advantage in its operations and will not unduly restrain competition." (Italics sup-
plied).
Another change was made in limiting the application of the proviso strictly to
"railroads." § 213(a) (1) had subjected to the proviso any "carrier as defined in § 1 (3)
of this title, or any person which is controlled by such a carrier or affiliated therewith."
As interpreted by the Commission, § 1(3) included not only railroads and other carriers
then subject to Commission jurisdiction but also water carriers which join with rail-
roads in joint tariffs and which engage in continuous transportation of passengers or
freight in conjunction with railroads. Puget Sound Nay. Co.-Control, 25 M. C. C. 53
(1939). That this construction is now impossible since the Transportation Act of 1940
became effective has been acknowledged by the Commission. St. Johns River Line Co.-
Purchase, 36 M. C. C. 338 (1941).
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within a limited sphere.3" The only addition to the unification provisions
made by the Transportation Act of 1940 is the entirely new Section
5 (2) (c), providing:
"(c) In passing upon any proposed transaction under the provi-
sion of this paragraph (2), the Commission shall give weight to the
following considerations, among others: (1) the effect of the pro-
posed transaction upon adequate transportation service to the public;
(3) the total fixed charges resulting from the proposed trans-
action; and (4) the interest of the carrier employees affected."
I.C.C. JURISDICTION UNDER SECTION 5(2)
The unification provisions of Section 5(2) are fairly simple to out-
line. Under subsection (a) it is made lawful with Commission approval
for two or more carriers to unify their properties and franchises by
merger or consolidation, by purchase, lease, or operating contract, or
by acquisition of control through stock ownership."' Likewise, a person
not a carrier may acquire control of two or more carriers through stock
ownership, or, if it already does control one carrier, it may acquire
control of another carrier. Then subsection (b) prescribes the pro-
cedure and conditions for Commission approval, with subsection (c),
set out above, indicating certain relevant considerations to be taken into
account by the Commission. That the intent is to make the types of
transactions enumerated in subsection (a) the only permissible ones is
30. Representative Bulwinkel, during debate, stated: "The conferees wish to make
it plain that it is not their intention, by changing the language of Section 213, herein-
before quoted [the railroad proviso), to change the legislative intent one iota with re-
spect to the acquisition of a carrier by motor vehicle by a carrier by railroad, and that
it is the intention of the conferees that Section 5(2) (b), as amended by Section 7 of the
conference report, shall have the same practical application and legal effect as Section
213(a) (1) as it is now shown in Part II of the Interstate Commerce Act." 85 CoG.
RE.C. 15583 (1940). In spite of this, and in spite of a similar statement made by Senator
Truman, 86 CONG. REc. 17510 (1940), Senator Shipstead ex-pressed fear that the change
in language might well be viewed as a relaxation of the safeguards against railroad in-
vasion of the niotor carrier domain. 86 CONG. REc. 17640-43 (1940).
31. The unification scctions contemplate the transfer of operating rights as well as
tangible property. Operating rights, often the principal object in a unification proceed-
ing, constitute more than a "license to operate." Yellow Truck Lines, Inc.-Purchase,
35 L C. C. 773 (1940) ; Hancock Truck Lines, Inc.-Purchase, 5 M. C C. 405 (1938);
Tri-State Transit Co. of La., Inc.-Purchase, 5 M. C. C. 317 (1937); Rutherford Frt.
Lines, Inc.-Purcase, 5 M. C. C. 207 (1937).
While both § 213 and now § 5 expressly permit two or more carriers jointly to make
acquisitions, the Commission has made approval of such transactions more difficult to
obtain than if joint control were not sought. Clover-Leaf Frt. Lines, Inc.-Purchase,
25 if. C. C. 742 (1939) ; Union Pac. R. R.-Control, 15 M. C. C. 101 (1938).
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clear from Section 5(4) which renders unlawful any effectuation of
control in a common interest of two or more carriers in any other way,
"however such result is attained, whether directly or indirectly, by use
of common directors, officers, or stockholders, a holding or investment
company or companies, a voting trust or trusts, or in any other manner
whatsoever."3 Inasmuch as all direct forms of unification are covered
by subsection (a), Commission supervision of unifications is complete
except where there is a specific exemption, and all indirect but nonetheless
effective means of exerting control are outlawed.
A basic principle applied by the Commission in interpreting former
Section 213, and equally relevant under Section 5(2), is that the uni-
fication provisions are wholly "permissive" in nature. That is, in every
case, the Commission makes an appraisal of whether or not the proposed
unification would be consistent with the public interest without heed to
whether it will subsequently fail for other reasons. No assumption will
be made that unification authority is likely to prove futile. Conse-
quently, arguments for Commission disapproval on the ground that
"grandfather" rights have not yet been granted, or are unfounded or
invalid, or that the contract for sale is being controverted, are disregarded
as irrelevant and reserved for later disposition by the Commission or
by the courts."
Assuming that the transaction proposed falls within the types of uni-
fication sanctioned by Section 5(2), Commission jurisdiction in other
respects must be established before the merits of the proposal will be
considered. A prerequisite for such jurisdiction is that the vendor
carrier possess rights to operate interstate.3 A carrier may hold such
32. Section 5(5) supplements § 5(4) by carefully defining when control or manage-
ment is effectuated so as to prevent escape from the Act by persons who are not them-
selves carriers but who are nevertheless affiliated with such carriers. Cf. McEwing-
Control, 25 M. C. C. 66 (1939); Atlantic Greyhound Corp.-Purchase, 25 M. C. C. 1
(1939).
33. Steffke-Purchase, 36 M. C. C. 371 (1941); Herrin Transp, Co.-Purchase, 35
M. C. C. 88 (1939); Southern Motor Exp., Inc.-Purchase, 35 M. C. C. 85 (1940);
English-Purchase, 35 M. C. C. 49 (1939); Consolidated Frt. Lines, Inc.-Control,
25 M. C. C. 207 (1939); Raymond Bros. Motor Transp., Inc.-Purchase, 15 M. C. C.
477 (1938) ; Triangle Exp. & Transfer Co.-Purchase, 5 M. C. C. 797 (1938) ; Brash-
bear Frt. Lines, Inc.-Control, 5 M. C. C. 218 (1937).
34. Motor Carrier Act, § 203(14), (15), (16), "Definitions and Exceptions," makes
it clear that the phrase "motor carrier" means a carrier, whether common or contract,
which operates in interstate commerce. The Commission invariably states that it has no
power to authorize the transfer of solely intrastate rights. See, e.g., Santa Fe Trail
Transp. Co.-Purchase, 5 M. C. C. 115 (1937).
Under § 213 not only must the vendor be engaged in interstate operations but he must
also be a carrier by motor vehicle. Thus, if a vendor were engaged in local pick-up and
delivery operations for a railroad, service subject to provisions of Part I of the Act, no
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rights only by reason of Commission approval of an application for a
certificate of convenience and necessity or confirmation of rights under
the "grandfather" clause.3" If no showing is made in the unification
proceeding that the vendor still possesses such rights " or, if on the
other hand, it affirmatively appears that the Commission has denied
vendor's claim to interstate rights, 37 or that they have been lost by
§ 213 jurisdiction exists. Modesto Interurban Ry.-Purchase, 15 M. C. C. 265 (193);
cf. Cincinnati & Lake Erie Transp. Co.-Consolidation, 36 M. C. C. 243 (1940) (one of
the proposed acquisitions was a reorganized railroad). Since § S has been broadened to
include unification of all carriers subject to Part I, Part II, or Part III, this ground
for lack of jurisdiction has been eliminated.
35. The "grandfather" clause is contained in the first proviso of the Motor Car-
rier Act, §206(a). Under this proviso, a motor common carrier which was in bona fide
operation on July 1, 1935, was entitled to a certificate without further showing of con-
venience and necessity upon filing an application within a specified period.
The second proviso to § 206(a) exempts a carrier engaged in operation solely within
a single state, but which carries freight or passengers in interstate commerce, from ob-
taining a certificate of convenience and necessity. However, by registering with the
Commission such carrier may obtain the right to conduct such interstate transportation
which the proviso makes otherwise subject to Commission jurisdiction. In a number of
cases, one of the earliest being K. & L. Transp. Co., Inc.-Purchase, 5 M. C. C. 67
(1937), approval was given to transactions of unification between an interstate carrier
and one operating between points within a single state but engaged in interstate com-
merce under the proviso. In some of the cases, starting with Illinois Greyhound Lines,
Inc.-Purcase, 15 A. C. C. 86 (1938), a certificate %was ordered issued to the acquiring
carrier upon approval of the unification, covering not only the physically interstate opera-
tions but also the acquired operations within one state as well. However, this entire
doctrine has been repudiated by the Commission in a recent decision which holds that
operations conducted under the proviso are not "property" which the Commission can
authorize to be transferred under § 5. Baggett Transp. Co.-Purchase, C. C. H. Fed.
Carriers Serv. It 7736 (1941).
The textual statement is somewhat misleading, for, because §5 is permissive and
because the Commission desired to expedite unification proceedings, unifications have
been approved after a vendor's application for "grandfather" rights has been filed but be-
fore it has been finally decided by the Commission. Brooks Transp. Co., Inc.-Purchase,
5 M. C. C. 85 (1937) ; see also note 33 supra. If vendor's application for operating rights
is later denied, operation over those routes will then have to be abandoned. However, in
Crichton-Purchase, 35 M. C. C. 661, 663 (1940), the Commission stated that once the
"grandfather" rights have been confirmed in the vendor, ". . . these temporary reasons
for assuming the motor-carrier status of a prospective vendor under section 213 are no
longer present." After confirmation a showing of continued interstate operation under
these rights is required.
36. Applicant must demonstrate that vendor possesses interstate rights even though
such rights have once been confirmed by the Commission. Chrispens Truck Lines, Inc.-
Purchase, 36 M. C. C. 343 (1941). Commissioner Porter dissented on the ground that
once acquired the proper status should be presumed to continue.
37. Humboldt Motor Stages, Inc.-Purchase, 36 'M. C. C. 183 (1940); Plaza Exp.
Co., Inc.-Purchase, 35 Mf. C. C. 447 (1940); Burlington Transp. Co.-Lease, 15 M. C.
C. 57 (1938) ; Gordon-Control, 5 M1. C. C. 373 (1938).
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abandonment,"8 or prior sale,39 the vendor cannot qualify as a carrier
under the Act and the unification application will be dismissed for lack
of jurisdiction.
Another ground for exclusion of motor carrier unifications from the
provisions of the Motor Carrier Act is the twenty vehicle exemption
originally contained in Section 213(e) and removed in 1940 to Section
5(10). Where only motor carriers are parties to the unification and
"where the aggregate number of motor vehicles owned, leased, con-
trolled or operated by such parties, for purposes of transportation sub-
ject to Part II, does not exceed twenty," no grant of authority by the
Commission is required.4" The aim of this exemption, as its legislative
history demonstrates, is to protect combination by small carriers from
the "red-tape" incident to Commission approval, 41 a purpose which has
been generally furthered by Commission interpretation. For example,
prior to a new general order of June 6, 1940, "vehicles" in Section
213(e) had been construed to mean the total number of physical units
38. Abandonment cases have caused a split in the Commission. The majority has
determined that physical operations are a condition precedent to Commission jurisdiction
under § 213, and, if the vendor has abandoned operations, an application to purchase those
operating rights will be dismissed. Chrichton-Purchase, 35 M. C. C. 661 (1940). In a
dissent to that decision Commissioner Porter argued that if it be true that § 213 is per-
missive no question concerning the validity of operating rights should be settled in a
§ 213 proceeding, and the question of abandonment should be reserved for later deter-
mination because it concerns the validity of operating rights. However, the doctrine an-
nounced by the majority has been followed in subsequent cases, and without respect to
the cause of the abandonment. Silver Fleet Motor Exp., Inc.-Purchase, 1 Fed. Carrier
Cases 17471 (1940); Carlo Transp. Co., Inc.-Purchase, 36 M. C. C. 482 (1941); B.
F. Walker, Inc.-Purchase, 36 M. C. C. 361 (1941); William C. Barry, Inc.-Purchase,
36 M. C. C. 335 (1941); cf. Motor Delivery Co.-Purchase, 36 M. C. C. 367 (1941);
Marshall-Purchase, 36 M. C. C. 33 (1940). However, if abandonment has caused
operating rights to be denied in a prior proceeding, it is agreed that the Commission
has no jurisdiction to authorize a transfer. Riss & Co., Inc.-Purchase, 35 M. C. C. 383
(1940) ; Krema Trucking Co.-Merger, 25 M. C. C. 85 (1939); Watson Bros. Transp.
Co., Inc.-Purchase, 15 M. C. C. 581 (1939).
39. Transohio Motor Frt., Inc.-Purchase, 35 M. C. C. 749 (1940); Watson Bros,
Transp. Co., Inc.-Purchase, 15 M. C. C. 581 (1939).
40. INTERSTATE ComaxERcE Acr § 5(10). The language used in §213(e) was vir-
tually identical. Many applications have been dismissed because fewer than 20 vehicles
were involved. See, e.g., Charlton Bros. Transp. Co.-Purchase, 36 M. C. C. 267 (1940) ;
Phoenix Motor Frt., Inc.-Lease, 35 M. C. C. 693 (1940) ; Webster-Purchase, 25 M.
C. C. 393 (1939).
41. "An amendment made by the committee makes this jurisdiction applicable, ex-
cept in the case of rail, express, or water carrier affiliations, only where the total num-
ber of vehicles involved is more than 20. In other words, we eliminated from this provi-
sion such a case, for example, as that of two small operators who might want to get
together, and we made it apply only to cases where they had more than 20 vehicles, so
that the small operators could get together without the necessity of going through a
great deal of red-tape with the Commission." Senator Wheeler, explaining the provi-
sions of S. 1629, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935), to the Senate, 79 Coxe. REC. 5655 (1935).
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-11 trucks, 6 tractors and 6 trailers equalled 23 vehicles. The new
rule, however, defined "vehicle" as a complete transportation unit, with
available tractors and trailers paired as one vehicle, and in terms of the
above illustration only 17 vehicles would be involved. 2
The foregoing discussion of the twenty vehicle exemption is mislead-
ing, however, in so far as it indicates that a unification so exempted
from the requirements of Section 5(2) is entirely free from Commis-
sion control. Such a conclusion had been reached by Sharfman, 43 but
apparently he overlooked the provision in Section 212(b), which pro-
vides that "except as provided in Section 5 (formerly Section 213), any
certificate or permit may be transferred, pursuant to such rules and
regulations as the Commission may prescribe." 4 By a general order
on July 1, 1938, the Commission did prescribe rules and regulations
requiring its approval of transfers of operating rights free from Sec-
tion 213 because of the twenty vehicle exemption, or for any other
reason as well.
4 5
The questions of whether the tAventy vehicle exemption in Section
5(10) places unifications beyond the reach of Section 212(b) where
twenty vehicles or less are involved, and of whether the Commission
possesses authority to require its approval as a condition precedent to
effective transfers subject to Section 212(b), if ever in real doubt, have
been settled by recent litigation.41 In July, 1940 the United States filed
an information against one Resler, charging that he had engaged in
interstate motor carrier operations over a specified route without a
certificate of public convenience and necessity. Resler filed a special plea
in bar, alleging that he had acquired requisite operating authority from
one Brady, to whom it had been granted originally. It was stipulated
that not more than twenty vehicles were involved and that Commission
approval had not been obtained. On direct appeal from a lower court
decision sustaining Resler's plea, the Supreme Court reversed and
returned the cause to the district court. Speaking for a unanimous
bench Mr. Justice Murphy held that the transfer was clearly subject
to Section 212(b) and that the Commission undoubtedly had authority
to require its prior consent even to transfers exempted from Section 213.
Unification among small carriers, then, is not completely free from
Commission supervision and "red-tape." Indeed, since the elimination
in 1938 of the requirement of public hearings under the unification
42. I. C. C., General Order, "Total Number of Vehicles Involved"--Tractor and
Semi-trailer as One Unit, June 6, 1940, C. C. H. Fed. Carriers Serv. 11591 (1940).
43. IV SHARFmkx, TE I,-TERsTATE Co.mER cE Commsslo. (1937) 112.
44. MOTOR C.iauER Acr §212(b).
45. I. C. C., General Order, Rules and Regulations Governing Transfers of Rights
to Operate as a Motor Carrier in Interstate or Foreign Commerce, July 1, 1938, 3 FED.
REG. 2157 (1938).
46. United States v. Resler, 61 Sup. Ct. 820 (U. S. 1941).
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provisions, the time-and-money-consuming procedure seems virtually par-
alleled under Section 212(b) -virtually, but not entirely. A unifi-
cation subject to Section 5(2) requires a showing of consistency with
the public interest, while the rules and regulations under Section 212(b)
merely demand that the proposed transferee be "fit, willing and able"
properly to perform the service authorized and to conform to the pro-
visions of the Motor Carrier Act. Because these latter standards are
more easily met, the policy of the Commission is saved from unqualified
indictment for defeating the expressed legislative purpose of Section
5 (10). But even this policy has been apparently jeopardized by language
in United States v. Resler. Mr. Justice Murphy, in justifying the rule
requiring Commission approval of a transfer subject to Section 212(b),
referred to Sections 206(a) and 207(a) pertaining to issuance of cer-
tificates of public convenience and necessity, and then stated:
"In many respects a transferee such as appellee stands in the same
relation to the Commission as an original applicant for permission to
operate. Many inquiries which are relevant to the initial application
are equally relevant to the proposed transfer. . . . Plainly the finding
of the requisite fitness, willingness and ability of the first applicant is
wholly inapplicable to his proposed transferee . . ., and the opera-
tions inceptively authorized may no longer serve public convenience
and necessity because conditions have changed."
' 47
Perhaps Mr. Justice Murphy means that the proper test to apply to
transfers under Section 212(b) is that of public convenience and neces-
sity. But if so, the transfers excluded from Section 5 are subject to
standards more difficult to meet than unifications within the section, for
consistency with the public interest has never been construed as equivalent
to fulfilling the demands of public convenience and necessity. Certainly
such an interpretation would reverse legislative purpose. Or possibly
Mr. Justice Murphy means to apply the test of public convenience and
necessity to unifications under Section 5 as well as to transfers under
Section 212(b). But such a construction would ignore differences in
statutory language and repudiate a long line of Commission decisions.
Whatever Mr. Justice Murphy means, and it is probable that he was
merely confused, this startling and wholly unnecessary paragraph has
cast doubts upon a host of Commission cases construing the Motor
Carrier Act. Fortunately, doubts created by such a dictum probably will
not be sufficient to alter the course of decisions.4
47. Id. at 822.
48. In Baggett Transp. Co.-Purchase, C. C. H. Fed. Carriers Serv. 117736 (1941),
a decision subsequent to United States v. Resler, supra note 46, the Commission stated:
"Public convenience and necessity, as we have frequently defined it, ordinarily requires
a higher degree of proof than mere consistency with public interest, and usually contem-
plates an entirely distinct set of circumstances. The issue of public convenience and
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CONSISTENCY WITH THE PUBLIC INTEREST
Consistency with the public interest is the basic criterion for judging
a unification transaction, which falls within the types permitted by Sec-
tion 5(2) (a) of Part I of the Interstate Commerce Act. This test is
set forth in paragraph (b) of Section 5(2), which provides for Com-
mission approval:
"If the Commission finds that, subject to such terms and condi-
tions and such modifications as it shall find to be just and reasonable,
the proposed transaction is within the scope of paragraph (a) and
will be consistent with the public interest."
49
Ever since the Motor Carrier Act went into effect in 1935, the Com-
mission has consistently asserted that a unification transaction may be
consistent with the public interest without being required by public con-
venience and necessity. The latter consideration has been held to relate
only to the question of whether or not to issue an original certificate
to operate, and has no place in a unification proceeding."0 Hence, the
improvement of motor carrier service by the creation of new through
routes or the addition of new schedules, while providing a new type of
service, is permitted with little regard to protestations that the area is
already adequately served and that additional service will only divert
revenue from existing carriers.51
necessity is not presented in the normal proceeding under section 5, and not being pre-
sented, cannot be decided."
49. INTERSTATE Co, r=acE AcT §5(2)(b).
50. Horlacher Delivery Serv., Inc.-Purchase, 35 M. C. C. 149 (1940); Herrin
Transp. Co.-Purchase, 35 M. C. C. 88 (1939); Elliot-Purchase, 25 M. C. C. 11
(1939); Raymond Bros. Motor Transp., Inc.-Purchase, 15 M. C. C. 477 (1938); Spit-
zer-Purchase, 15 261. C. C. 331 (1938); Arrow Carrier Corp.-Purchase, 15 M. C. C.
203 (1938); Transamerican Frt. Lines, Inc.-Purchase, 5 M. C. C. 712 (1938); Keeshin
Motor Exp. Co., Inc.-Leases, 1 M. C. C. 373 (1936). See also note 48 supra.
Some difference in meaning seems demanded by the difference in statutory language
used. That is, §207, the application section, requires that operations be "required by
public convenience and necessity," while § 213 merely requires the unification to be "con-
sistent with the public interest."
51. The Interstate Commerce Act, §5(2)(c), now provides that the Commission
in a unification proceeding must consider inter alia "the effect of the proposed transac-
tion upon adequate transportation service to the public." It is doubtful that this injunc-
tion changes Commission considerations in this respect. Cases decided since the new Act
became effective have restated the principle that unification considerations are different
from those involved in an application proceeding, especially with reference to the crea-
tion of new through routes. Steffke-Purchase, 36 M. C. C. 371 (1941) ; Carolina Frt.
Carriers Corp.-Purchase, 36 M. C. C. 251 (1941); Clark-Lease, 36 M. C. C. 195
(1940) ; Marshall-Purchase, 36 M. C. C. 33 (1940). It is possible that more attention
will be given to diverted traffic and revenue. On the other hand, no application has yet
been denied for this reason, and it is worth noting that the question is one of the effect
of the unification "upon adequate transportation service to the public." If diversiun had
injured adequate service to the public, the application would likely have been declared
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It will be recalled that in the Transport case it was the failure to meet
the test of consistency with the public interest which led to the Com-
mission's denial of the application. The four factors there considered
were resulting economies and improvements in service, elimination of
motor carrier competition, propriety of the consideration and promoters'
fees, and simplification of corporate structure. These same factors, to
a greater or lesser degree, run through the great mass of motor carrier
cases which preceded the Transport case and from them a clearer picture
of the Commission's general policy can be drawn.
Economies and Improvements in Service. By reason of paragraph (c)
of Section 5(2), added in 1940, the Commission is directed to give
weight to the effect of any proposed unification upon adequate trans-
portation service to the public. 2 Since such a direction does not require
an affirmative showing of an improvement in service offered to the
public, it probably remains true that a unification transaction can be
consistent with the public interest so long as it is "not contradictory or
hostile thereto." 53 The Commission, however, perhaps influenced by the
previous cases involving railroad unifications, 54 almost always discovers
and relies upon some improvement in the service offered to the public
when it finds a unification consistent with the public interest. There is
virtually no end to the factors taken into account by the Commission
inconsistent with public interest under § 213 even without the specific mandate. It would
seem, then, that the new Act probably has not changed prior practice in this respect. But
note that in two very recent instances considerations of public convenience and necessity
seemingly are being taken into account as a basis for disapproval of unifications which
may bring about increases in competition and thereby endanger adequate service for the
public. Consolidated Freightways, Inc.-Purchase, No. MC-F-1317, Apr. 23, 1941; Con-
solidated Freightways, Inc.-Purchase, Proposed Report by Examiner Engelhart, No.
MC-F-1318, May 27, 1941.
52. INTERSTATE COMIERCE ACT § 5(2) Cc).
53. Merchant's Dispatch, Inc.-Purchase, 25 M. C. C. 407 (1939).
54. The Transportation Act of 1920, 41 STAT. 481 (1920), permitted railroad unifi-
cations when the proposal was "in the public interest." This was changed by the Emer-
gency Railroad Transportation Act of 1933, 48 STAT. 217 (1933), 49 U. S. C. § 5(4) (b)
(1934) to approval of unifications which "will promote the public interest." Inasmuch
as no distinction in the meaning of the two phrases was drawn by the Commission or the
courts, the further change of criterion to consistency with public interest, now provided
for railroad unifications (INTERSTATE CO3MERCE ACT § 5(2) (b), as amended by the
Transportation Act of 1940), probably will not alter prior interpretation. The original
phrase, "in the public interest," was determined by the Supreme Court to have "direct re-
lation to adequacy of transportation service, to its essential conditions of economy and effi-
ciency, and to appropriate provision and best use of transportation facilities," N. Y. Cent.
Secur. Co. v. United States, 287 U. S. 12, 25 (1932). See also, Texas v. United States, 292
U. S. 522 (1934); United States v. Lowden, 308 U. S. 225 (1939); Fort Worth & R. G.
Ry., Control, Operation, Etc., 217 1. C. C. 659 (1936) ; Union Pac. R. R.-Unification,
207 I. C. C. 543 (1935) ; Unification of Lines in Southern New Jersey, 193 I. C. C. 183
(1933) ; Control of Central Calif. Traction Co., 131 I. C. C. 125 (1927) ; Lease of Val-
ley Terminal Ry., Property, 65 I. C. C. 105 (1920).
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in measuring such improvement. New through routes, faster and more
frequently scheduled runs, better equipment, and economies effected by
elimination of duplicate routes, terminal facilities and administrative
staffs, and by large scale purchasing, are reasons frequently adduced for
approval of unifications. 5 Reliance is also placed upon more balanced
loadings, more direct relations with and responsibility to regulatory
authorities, improved financial backing, and guarantees of continued
operation by the vendee where otherwise the vendor might become bank-
rupt or abandon operations because of ill health or some pressing per-
sonal matter. 6 In finding consistency with the public interest the Com-
mission significantly does not require that any savings resulting from a
unification be passed on to the public in the form of lower rates. Cur-
rently it views the problem as one of achieving internal stability and
minimum rates rather than as one of protecting the public from exor-
bitant charges. 57 Should conditions change, however, it is possible that
the Commission might require lower service costs as a necessary incident
to unification.
Undue Elimination of Comnpetition. Although former Section 213
contained no express provision against the elimination of competition,
except in the proviso applicable to rail carriers acquiring motor carriers,
the Commission held that undue elimination of competition was incon-
sistent with the public interest."' Nor does Section 5(2) furnish any
55. Cleveland, Columbus & Cincinnati H'w'y, Inc.-Purhase, 31J M. C. C. 325
(1941) ; Lee Way Motor Frt., Inc.-Purchase, 36 M. C. C. 322 (1941) ; Gateway City
Transfer Co., Inc.-Purchase, 36 M. C. C. 297 (1940); Boss-Linco Lines, Inc.-Consuli-
dation, 36 M. C. C. 272 (1940) ; Carolina Frt. Carriers Corp.-Purchase, 36 M. C. C.
259 (1940); Yellow Cab Transit Co.-Purchase, 36 M. C. C. 239 (1940); Campb2l
Sixty-Six Exp., Inc.-Purchase, 36 M. C. C. 209 (1940); Liberty Trucking Co.-Pur-
chase, 36 M. C. C. 203 (1940).
56. Red Star Exp. Lines of Auburn, Inc.-Purhase, 36 M. C. C. 355 (1941); Great
Southern Trucking Co.-Purchase, 36 M. C. C. 350 (1941); Western Truck Lines-Pur-
chase, 36 M-\. C. C. 347 (1941); Merillat-Purchase, 36 M. C. C. 331 (1941); Arkan-sas
Motor Frt. Lines, Inc.-Purchase, 36 M. C. C. 264 (1940); Bos Truck Lines, Inc.-
Purchase, 36 M. C. C. 216 (1940); Consolidated Copperstate Lines--Merger, 36 M. C.
C. 159 (1940).
57. "In the railway industry, it was the original purpose of regulation to prevent
monopolistic price increases by establishing maximum rates. In the trucking industry, it
is the apparent purpose of regulation to prevent competitive price reductions by estab-
lishing minimum rates." WILcoX, Comi.P-TrrIoN AND MfOI0FOLY IN Az.I=IC I*DVSTny,
T. N. E. C. Monograph 21 (1940) 268. In pursuit of this policy the Commission has
established minimum rates in many areas, invoking a power seldom used for railvay
rates. Trunk Line Motor Carrier Rates, 24 M. C. C. 501 (1940) ; Middle Atlantic States
fotor Carrier Rates, 10 If. C. C. 193 (1938); New England Territory Commodity
Rates, 8 M. C. C. 387 (1938); Central Territory Motor Carrier Rates, S M. C. C. 233
(1938).
58. Richmond-Greyhound Lines, Inc.-Control, 35 M. C. C. 555 (1940); Eastcrn
Michigan Transp. Corp.-Control, 25 M. C. C. 483 (1939); Northland-Greyhound Lines,
Inc.-Purchase, 5 M. C. C. 123 (1937).
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more express guarantee against restraint of competition than former
Section 213."9 Any unification of competing carriers by its very nature
reduces competition of a kind, just as any commercial contract is a
restraint of trade."0 But under the Motor Carrier Act, as under the
Sherman Act, something more is necessary for condemnation. The
boundaries of the doctrine of illegal restraints are flexible and uncertain;
given the same facts reasonable men may and do differ, as in the Trans-
port case. Some elimination of competition may be compatible with the
public interest; apparently, only when monopoly is approximated is the
public interest deemed in jeopardy and the restraint of competition re-
garded undue. With motor carriage, an industry characterized by severe
competition, it is only rarely that such a condition of monopoly is ever
approximated.
There have been only three disapprovals of proposed motor carrier
unifications, the Transport case excepted, on the ground of undue elim-
ination of competition.0 x All three of these cases were later reversed,
two after reconsideration of this very factor. 2 The first of these
cases, Northland-Greyhound Lines, Inc. z -often called the Liederbach
case-involved an application by Northland-Greyhound, which operated
between Chicago and Minneapolis-St. Paul via Wisconsin, to purchase
its only through-route competitor. The Commission disapproved the pur-
chase, principally because it found the elimination of competition unde-
sirable."4 Commissioner Eastman dissented on the ground that potential
competition and competition provided by railroad and private car were
adequate protection against monopoly. Almost two years later upon a
renewal of the application, the Commission adopted Commissioner East-
man's view completely and approved the purchase.
0 0
59. INTERSTATE COMMERCE ACT § 5(2) ; cf. note 51 supra.
60. This is not to say that the elimination of a competitor by absorption necessarily
reduces the effectiveness of competition if other competitors remain in the field. See, e.g.,
CHAmBERLI N, THE THEORY OF MoNOPOLISTIC COMPETITION (3d ed. 1938) pas'shn.
61. Northland-Greyhound Lines, Inc.-Purchase, 5 M. C. C. 123 (1937); Eastern
Michigan Transp. Corp.-Control, 25 M. C. C. 483 (1939); Richmond-Greyhound Lines,
Inc.-Control, 35 M. C. C. 555 (1940). Cases concerning acquisitions by another car-
rier or a motor carrier owned by or affiliated with such other carrier are not included.
For such cases, see note 151 infra.
62. Northland-Greyhound Lines, Inc.-Purchase, 25 M. C. C. 109 (1939) (reversing
on ground of no undue elimination of competition); Eastern Michigan Transp. Co.-
Control, 36 M. C. C. 413 (1941) (reversing for reason stated in note 66 inlra) ; Richmond-
Greyhound Lines, Inc.-Control, No. MC-F-119, June 11, 1941 (reversing on ground of
no undue elimination of competition).
63. Northland-Greyhound Lines, Inc.-Purchase-Liederbach, 5 M. C. C. 123 (1937).
64. Id. at 125.
65. Northland-Greyhound Lines, Inc.-Purchase, 25 M. C. C. 109 (1939). The Com-
mission at 112 stated: "In view of the competition which the railroads and private auto-
mobiles are offering and will continue to offer, Northland will have sufficient difficulty in
maintaining safe, attractive, and economical service even if Liederbach's competition is
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Shortly after the reconsideration of the Morthland-Greyhound case,
the Commission denied authority for Greyhound Corporation to acquire
control of a competitor in the southern Michigan region for the reason
that it would extend to Greyhound a virtual monopoly of bus transporta-
tion within that area."0 The Northland-Greyhound case was distinguished
on the ground that here railroad interests and Greyhound interests were
too interwoven to be deemed competitive. This combination, thought
the Commission, threatened to block independent motor competition in
the area where otherwise a strong independent bus carrier could easily
be supported.
7
The last and most interesting case in this series, Richinond-GrevIzotnd
Lines, Inc., was first decided by Division 5 in June, 1940, and was
reopened and reversed a year later by the full Commission."0 The region
served extended from Norfolk, Virginia to Richmond and points north,
principally Washington and Baltimore. Both applicant and vendor pos-
sessed rights to carry passengers between these points, but over routes
which were complementary rather than duplicate. The contrast between
the earlier decision denying authority and the later one granting it is so
sharp that a discussion of both is warranted. In the original decision it was
felt that approval of the application would afford Greyhound interests "a
monopoly of bus transportation to Norfolk, except over routes south
through North Carolina," and that these remaining routes were so ex-
tremely circuitous as to offer no effective competition. This possibility of
monopoly alarmed the Commission and the application was denied square-
ly on the point that the threatened undue restraint of competition was in-
consistent with the public interest. The reconsidered Northland-Greyhoynid
case was distinguished on two grounds: first, the slowness, expensiveness
and inconvenience of railroad service to Norfolk, and second, the reluc-
tance of Virginia regulatory authorities to sanction a second bus opera-
tion after authorization of a first one. This latter impediment, coupled
with that of meeting a large and well-established competitor, was deemed
eliminated . . . The automotive era has imposed a ceiling beyond which carriers' fares
cannot be projected profitably, and a standard of service below which carriers dare not
fall. Moreover, regulatory commissions may at any time, upon a showing of public con-
venience and necessity, authorize another operation."
66. Eastern Michigan Transp. Corp.-Control, 25 M. C. C. 483 (1939). This case
has since been reversed, 36 M. C. C. 413 (1941), not because of a change in attitude
toward restraint of competition, but because the Commission decided that the applicant
already had control of the carrier to be acquired through an intermediate holding com-
pany.
67. Mr. Eastman, for reasons he had advanced in the Northland-Grcyhou:d case,
again dissented. Eastern Michigan Transp. Corp.--Control, 25 M. C. C. 483, 490 (1939).
68. Richmond-Greyhound Lines, Inc.-Control, 35 M. C. C. 555 (1940) (Division 5
consisted of Comnrs. Eastman, Lee and Rogers; Commissioner Eastman dissented$,
reversed by the full Commission in No. MC-F-119, June 9, 1941 (Commrs. Porter and
Rogers dissented; Commissioner Lee did not participate).
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to make the hazards so formidable that no new competitor would seek
to enter the area even if the Commission at a later date desired to issue
a new certificate of convenience and necessity. In concluding, the Com-
mission endeavored. to draw a sharp distinction between competition
within the motor carrier field and that afforded by other methods of
transportation, and voiced a strong desire to maintain competition be-
tween motor bus operators rather than to rely upon competition from
other types of transportation facilities. Such a policy it deemed to be
the best protection against undesirable monopoly.69
The reversal of the Richmond-Greyhound case was a complete about-
face on the issue of competition so far as the circumstances of the par-
ticular case were concerned. Pointing out that applicant and vendor com-
peted at only six terminal points, all of which except Norfolk would
continue to have competitive service, the Commission gave its approval
with little explanation other than this statement:
"It is our opinion that the traveling public in the entire territory
served by Peninsula (the vendor) should not be deprived of the
later-mentioned benefits simply because such approval possibly would
result in some elimination of competition."
70
Since virtually all the "later-mentioned benefits" were present in the
original proceeding, there can be little doubt but that the attitude of the
full Commission toward restraint of competition is considerably milder
than that of the majority of Division 5. Indeed, it can be said that
69. Richmond-Greyhound Lines, Inc.-Control, 35 M. C. C. 555 (1940), quoting
with approval from another case: "Competition from within the field of one's endeavor
is one thing; that from without is quite another . . . Thus, competition from without
is met by the inherent advantages of a possibly inferior service, and the operator thrives
while the patrons are denied that ultimate in service and convenience which they have a
right to expect and which would be fostered by direct competition from within the field
of endeavor."
Commissioner Eastman's dissent to the original Rich mond-Greyhound decision is
the fullest articulation of his contrary view toward monopoly in the motor carrier field.
Doubting the majority's view that regulated monopoly within the industry was neceS-
sarily undesirable, he contended that motor carriers face competition more prevalent
than ever before. Agreeing that strong competition, for reasons other than the danger of
monopoly, would be preferable to national domination of bus transportation by Greyhound,
he expressed his belief that the particular transaction before the Commission was not ot
"crucial importance" in furthering the likelihood of such domination. Pointing out the
general undesirability of duplicate operations and the need of absorbing the vendor into
an efficient system, he could find no proof that immediate benefits in terms of improved
service would be overcome by ultimate unfortunate consequences. Id. at 568.
70. See Richmond-Greyhound Lines, Inc.-Control, No. MC-F-119, June 9, 1941,
at 5. The Commission also conditioned its approval upon renewal by the applicant of an
offer made at the date of the original decision to sell to protestants one of the vendor's




to date no unification has been permanently blocked solely because of the
danger of monopoly.
71
The most striking feature of these cases in which the Commission has
been obliged to deal with the elimination of competition is that all involved
bus transportation, and in each case the applicant was a member of the
Greyhound system. When confronted with a unification either of busses
or trucks, the Commission in other cases, again excepting the Transport
case, has been almost eager to discount elimination of competition, even
when the combination unified all motor competitors within a given area. 2
In those cases the Commission has accepted as valid the arguments of
potential competition from other motor carriers through the issuance
of a new certificate to operate and of almost ever-present railroad and
private carrier competition. Hence, these vacillations over Greyhound
expansions would seem to stem not from a wish to insure motor com-
petition per se within an area so much as from indecision as to the
extent to which that area should be protected from a certain kind of
monopoly, namely, "big" monopoly.
Propriety of Consideration. In every motor carrier unification, whether
consummated by purchase, acquisition of control, or merger or consoli-
dation, the propriety of the amount of consideration must be established,
and also the fitness of the form of payment. In the absence of such
a showing the Commission may upset a transaction under Section
5(2) (b) as inconsistent with the public interest on the ground that its
terms are not "just and reasonable."3  The consideration problem is
essentially one of property valuation and its solution is especially diffi-
71. In another decision, Southwestern-Greyhound Lines, Inc.-Purchase, No. MAC-
F-1257, June 11, 1941, handed down the same day as the reversal in Richmand-Gryhhord
Lines, Inc., the Commission by Division 4 approved the purchase by a different Grey-
hound subsidiary of the operating rights of its only competitor between Amarillo, Texas,
and Raton, N. M. Protests on the basis of undue restraint of competition were over-
ruled on the grounds that there was insufficient traffic over the route to support tivo
efficient carriers, that there would not be any substantial adverse effect upon the pro-
testing carriers, and that improved service to the public would result. Commissioner
Porter, in a vigorous dissent, attacked the majority's reasoning and expressed grave
concern that the transaction was just another step toward the creation of "big" bus
monopoly.
72. Blue Way Trailways, Inc.-Purchase, 35 M. C. C. 763 (1940); Dalby Motor
Frt. Lines, Inc.-Purchase, 35 M. C. C. 619 (1940); Fleming-Purchase, 35 M. C. C.
607 (1940); Ramos-Control, 35 M. C. C. 9 (1939); Whitney-Purchase, 5 M. C. C.
593 (1938); Reddish-Purchase, 5 M. C. C. 581 (1938) ; Germann Bros. Motor Transp.,
Inc.-Purchase, 5 M. C. C. 514 (1938); Bowen Motor Coaches-Purchase, 5 M. C. C.
385 (1938); Peoples' Frt. Line, Inc.-Purchase, 5 M. C. C. 296 (1937).
73. This has been the construction placed upon § 5 (2) (b) by the Commission. The
precise statutory language is that if the Commission finds that, "subject to such terms
and conditions and such modifications as it shall find to be just and reasonable, the pro-
posed transaction . . .will be consistent wvith the public interest," it shall give its ap-
proval.
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cult in the case of motor carriers where physical property is so much
less important a factor than in the bulk of the transportation industry.
With no investment in right of way, the chief tangible assets of a motor
carrier are its vehicles and, to a lesser extent, its terminal facilities,
neither of which are large in contrast with the same items for rail and
water carriers. 4 On the other hand its intangible property, principally
operating rights, and to a lesser extent good will and going concern
value," plays a relatively much more prominent role than with other
carriers. Thus the proper relation of the total consideration paid to the
intangible property acquired is one of the most critical issues in motor
carrier unification.
The position of the Commission on valuation of intangible property
is not entirely clear and many contradictions, superficially at least, can
be found in the cases. In the Transport case, it will be recalled, the con-
demned transaction involved a total consideration of over $22,000,000,
of which more than half was in payment for operating rights of the
various carriers.76 Emphasizing this fact, the Commission specifically
found that the proposed total capitalization was not supported by in-
tangible assets nor by past nor prospective earnings. Moreover, it flatly
stated that these elements afforded, in the case of motor carriers, even
less justification as a basis for 'capitalization than they did with rail
carriers. 7' Thus the opinion, standing alone, opens up the old question
of what value may be attached to intangible property in acquisition
proceedings.
The decision obviously does not mean that no consideration may be
paid for operating rights acquired inasmuch as the Commission has
approved an overwhelming proportion of applications where intangible
elements of value have been recognized. Substantial payments have been
permitted for physical property and for operating rights where the latter
74. The Commission has recognized this distinguishing factor. See Union Bus Lines,
Inc.-Purchase, 5 M. C. C. 201, 205 (1937); 54th ANN. REP. I. C. C. (1940) 32. But cf.
The Transport Co.-Control, 36 M. C. C. 61, 91 (1940).
75. In property valuation doctrine, the elements of intangible value generally regard-
ed as being involved are franchise value (corresponding to value of operating rights
here), good will value (which has played little part in motor carrier valuation), and
going concern value, the last named being regarded as theoretically distinct from the
first two. In public utility rate making cases the United States Supreme Court has
raised serious doubt as to this separate going concern value, both in failing to define it
in any understandable fashion and to set up any means for determining its existence and
amount. See 2 BONBRiGHT, VALUATrbON OF PROPERTY (1937) 1142-51. In Public Serv.
Interstate Transp. Co.-Purchase, 5 M. C. C. 735 (1938), the Commission said that
going concern value was merely "a talking point, without substance or evidentiary value,
and is not helpful."
76. See p. 1379 supra.
77. See The Transport Co.-Control, 36 M. C. C. 61, 91 (1940). See also p. 1403
infra.
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item has been the larger.78 Even more striking are the numerous cases
where like payments have been sanctioned for operating rights unac-
companied by any transfer of tangible assets." In terms of both results
and specific language the Commission has clearly recognized that the
right to operate over a certain route possesses a commercial value which
must be paid for in an acquisition, and that this value may to some extent
be estimated by past and prospective earnings. It should be noted,
however, that the existence of past earnings is not a requisite, for intan-
gible value has been recognized even where no past earnings existed.,
In drawing generalizations from cases where approval has been given,
and reserving for subsequent discussion cases where unification authority
has been denied, it should be remembered that each case stands to a large
extent upon its own facts. The Commission's approach, after analysis
of the financial statements of both the vendor and acquiring carrier,
is first to reach a conclusion as to the justification of the proposed pur-
chase price on the basis of earnings. Due weight is given to past earn-
ings of the vendor and even more to estimated future income of the
acquiring carrier on the assumption of the completion of the acquisi-
tion." In this latter respect innumerable variables, some of which are
also relevant to establish consistency with the public interest in other
respects, have been taken into account, including management ability
of the acquiring carrier, s2 prospective economies,83 character of the
78. United Truck Lines, Inc.-Purchase, 35 M. C. C. 705 (1940) (consideration
$17,000, intangibles $9,000); Herrin Transp. Co.-Purchase, 35 If. C. C. 88 (1939)
(consideration $17,375, intangibles $14,500); Crichton-Purchase, 25 11. C. C. 7S3
(1939) (consideration $22,519, intangibles $13,064); Gay's Exp., Inc.-Purchase, 25
M1. C. C. 716 (1939) (consideration $6,000, intangibles 0$5,200) ; Keeshin Transcon. Frt.
Lines, Inc.-Control, 5 M. C. C. 25 (1937) (consideration $250,000, intangibles $186,811).
79. Crown Coach Co.-Purchase, 36 If. C. C. 144 (1940) ($65,000); Luper Transp.
Co. of Okla.-Purchase, 36 M. C. C. 17 (1940) ($17,500); Cooperative Bus Co.-Pur-
chase, 25 Ml. C. C. 793 (1939) ($18,500); Buckingham Transp. Co. of Colo.-Purchase,
25 Mf. C. C. 667 (1939) ($15,000); Brooks Transp. Co.-Purchase, 5 I. C. C. 35
(1937) ($15,000).
80. Crown Coach Co.-Purchase, 36 Ml. C. C. 144 (1940); Century System, Inc.-
Purchase, 35 M1. C. C. 97 (1940); East Texas Motor Frt. Lines-Purchase, 25 M. C. C.
779 (1939); Buckingham Transp. Co. of Coo.--Purchase, 25 M. C. C. 667 (1939);
Virginia Carolina Coach Co.-Purchase, 1 M. C. C. 309 (1936).
81. Horlacher Delivery Serv., Inc.-Purchase, 35 M. C. C. 149 (1940); cf. Grey-
hound Corp.-ferger, 36 M. C. C. 397 (1941); Kittrell-Control, 35 M. C. C. 25
(1939) ; Virginia Carolina Coach Co.-Purchase, 1 M. C. C. 309 (1936). The relevance
of these factors is better shown in the denial cases cited notes 104 and 105 ififra.
82. Mid-States Frt. Lines, Inc., 36 M1. C. C. 1 (1940); Bowen-Control, 25 M. C.
C. 683 (1939); Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co.-Control, 5 M. C. C. 81 (1937); cf. Cen-
tury System, Inc.-Purchase, 35 Al. C. C. 97 (1940).
83. Crown Coach Co.-Purchase, 36 f. C. C. 144 (1940); Burlington Transp. Co.-
Purchase, 5 If. C. C. 291 (1937); Virginia Carolina Coach Co.-Purchase, I M. C. C.
309 (1926).
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
vendor's routes in relation to the acquiring carrier's existing system, 4
population tendencies in the territory served,"" and many others. From
this evidence there is not the slightest doubt but that the Commission has
accepted the proposition that operating rights may be more valuable to
an acquiring carrier than they were in the hands of the vendor.80 Then
secondly, and related to the earnings basis, the Commission determines
whether the price involved is so large that the financial security of the
acquiring carrier may be endangered and public service thereby jeopard-
ized.87  In this connection the size of the acquiring carrier has been
deemed relevant."' Finally, the Commission takes into account more
general factors such as possible public benefit in the form of improved
transportation service.
The Commission is concerned with the medium of payment as well
as with the amount of consideration, especially in view of Section 5 (2) (c)
which enjoins it to give proper weight to the fixed charges resulting from
the proposed acquisition." This problem has not been particularly acute,
since in most cases where approval has been given the purchase price has
been cash, a fact which has been influential in otherwise doubtful cases,"
While in several denial cases the increase in the acquiring carrier's fixed
charges has afforded the basis for the Commission's action, 1 several other
acquisitions have been approved where a major part of the price was to
be paid in installments maturing over varying periods, in one instance
as long as eleven years. 2 In one case the Commission found the increase
84. Crown Coach Co.-Purchase, 36 M. C. C. 144 (1940); Horlacher Delivery
Serv., Inc.-Purchase, 35 M. C. C. 149 (1940); Cooperative Bus Co.-Purchase, 25 M.
C. C. 793 (1939) ; Shawmut Transp. Co., Inc.-Purchase, 25 M. C. C. 686 (1939) ; cf.
Marion Trucking Co., Inc.-Purchase, 36 M. C. C. 430 (1941).
85. Public Serv. Interstate Transp. Co.-Purchase, 5 M. C. C. 735 (1938).
86. Cooperative Bus Co.-Purchase, 25 M. C. C. 793 (1939); Virginia Carolina
Coach Co.-Purchase, 1 M. C. C. 309 (1936).
87. Harris Transp. Co.-Purchase, 35 M. C. C. 88 (1934); New England Grey-
hound Lines, Inc.-Purchase, 25 M. C. C. 771 (1939). This principle is brought out
much more forcibly in the denial cases, cited notes 104 and 105 infra.
88. Public Serv. Interstate Transp. Co.-Purchase, 5 M. C. C. 735 (1938).
89. While this explicit direction was inserted in the statute only in September, 1940,
when § 213 was replaced by § 5(2), the Commission had considered this factor since the
beginning of its administration of the Act.
90. See, e.g., New England Greyhound Lines, Inc.-Purchase, 25 M. C. C. 771
(1939).
91. The leading case is Union Bus Lines, Inc.-Purchase, 5 M. C. C. 201 (1937),
discussed p. 1402 infra. Also applicable are Buckingham Transp. Co. of Colo., Inc.-
Purchase, 36 M. C. C. 313 (1940); Hill Bus Co.-Purchase, 36 M. C. C. 250 (1940);
Kendall-Control, 5 M. C. C. 563 (1938); Pacific Frt. Lines--Purchase, 5 M. C. C.
502 (1938).
92. Crown Coach Co.-Purchase, 36 M. C. C. 144 (1940) (11 years); Luper Transp.
Co. of Okla.-Purchase, 36 M. C. C. 17 (1940) (4 years); Red Star Exp. Lines of
Auburn-Purchase, 36 M. C. C. 355 (1941) (1Y2 years) ; Watt-Purchase, 35 M. C. C.
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in fixed charges not contrary to the public interest in view of the
vendor's past earnings record. 3 In another, however, where no such
evidence existed, the Commission approved the acquisition and the
increase in fixed charges with no explanation other than the statement
that consideration had been given to Section 5(2)(c)."
One further matter remains before passing on to the denial cases.
While substantial payments for operating rights and other intangible
property have been permitted, the Commission has been wary of the
effect of such acquisitions on the assets accounts of the acquiring car-
rier. Fearing that undue increases in carriers' "Intangible Property"
accounts, which it has characterized as reflecting "fictitious asset posi-
tions," might prove detrimental to the sound economic development
of the industry, it adopted at the very beginning the policy of requiring
such increases to be amortized or otherwise written off. 5 The develop-
ment of this policy is itself illuminating. In the initial case establishing
this requirement, the Commission simply conditioned its approval on
amortization from earnings of the amount of the increase in intangible
property.98 In subsequent cases it was generally required that such an
increase be amortized over a definite period, usually five or ten years,
or, in the alternative, that a proportionate amount of the increase be
written off to surplus each year. T More recently the policy has tended
to become stricter, and immediate write-off to surplus of the amount
of increase is now often the rule, if the financial position of the acquir-
ing carrier so permits."" In this fashion the Commission has consider-
755 (1940) (2 years); Pacific 'Motor Trucking Co.--Control, 35 M. C. C. 353 (1940) (5
years) ; System Frt. Service-Purchase, 35 '. C. C. 29 (1939) (44. years) ; Kittrell-
Control, 35 M. C. C. 25 (1939) (5 years); Crichton-Purlase, 25 M. C. C. 783 (1939)
(2 years) ; Johnson-Purchase, 25 11. C. C. 663 (1939) (5 years).
93. Greyhound Corp.-Merger, 36 *M. C. C. 397 (1941).
94. Luper Transp. Co. of Olda.-Purchase, 36 M. C. C. 17 (1940).
95. The Commission's explanation of this write-off policy is that the "artificial"
asset position otherwise created might later be used as a basis "to secure credit, or cited
as a justification for future issues of securities." Consolidated Freightvwys, Inc.-Lease,
25 'm. C. C. 723 (1939). The Commission has also been influenced by the experience in
railroad and public utility expansions, where "ill-advised purchases of properties or con-
trolling interests therein at extravagant and unwarranted prices in connection with the
building up of large systems" had rather unfortunate consequences. Union Bus Lines,
Inc.-Purchase, 5 M. C. C. 201, 204 (1937).
96. Virginia Carolina Coach Co.-Purchase, 1 M. C. C. 309 (1936).
97. See, e.g., Herrin Transp. Co.-Purchase, 25 M. C. C. 710 (1939); Blue Way
Trailways, Inc.-Merger, 25 'M. C. C. 735 (1939); Cantlay & Tanzola, Inc.-Purchase,
25 M. C. C. 756 (1939); Mid-States Frt. Lines, Inc.--Consolidation, 36 M. C. C. 1
(1940); Main Trucking Co., Inc.-Purchase, 36 M. C. C. 430 (1941).
98. For example, in Carolina Norfolk Truck Line-Purchase, 36 M. C. C. 404
(1941), the Commission held that in view of the acquiring carrier's surplus "no undue
hardship would ensue if the amount so recorded (intangible value) were immediately
charged off to surplus." For like instances, see Greyhound Corp.-Merger, 3ti M. C. C.
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ably tempered its recognition of intangible property values in acqui-
sitions.
The denial cases, in contrast to the approval cases, are generally more
emphatic and precise, so much so that unless one bears in mind the
results in the latter, a distorted picture of the Commission's policy may
easily be drawn. The leading denial case, at least prior to the Transport
case, was Union Bus Lines, Inc., decided in 1937.9 There one Bowen,
an established motor carrier, organized a new corporation which sought
to acquire for $225,000 the physical assets and operating rights of
another carrier in order to incorporate them into his system. $25,000
of the purchase price was to be paid in cash and the $200,000 balance
in ten year interest bearing obligations. The value of the vendor's
tangible property was only $16,000 and its average net income for
1934-1936 had been approximately $11,000, or slightly over a 5%
return on $225,000. With full realization that operating rights had
a commercial value and that it should not be too rigorous in its require-
ments, and despite the past earnings of the vendor and Bowen's alleged
ability to utilize vendor's routes in his system with increased financial
success, the Commission disapproved the application. Citing the un-
certainties of motor carrier earnings and Section 216(h) which pre-
cludes consideration of intangible values in rate making,"'0 and placing
particular emphasis on the dangers of financing expansion by increases
in indebtedness, the Commission found that payment of an amount
thirteen times the tangible property value of the acquired assets was
clearly excessive. In summing up, the Commission said:
"If transactions of this character are to be approved and become
at all common and widespread, the burden which they will place
upon the motor-carrier industry must be obvious. The investment
in operating rights, which initially cost little or nothing, will vastly
exceed the investment in physical property actually used in con-
ducting the operations. We are unable to believe that such a situa-
tion is healthy or should be permitted to develop." 101
397 (1941); C. & D. Motor Delivery Co.-Purchase, 36 M. C. C. 367 (1941); Red Star
Exp. Lines of Auburn, Inc.-Purchase, 36 M. C. C. 355 (1941); Great So. Trucking
Co., Inc.-Purchase, 36 M. C. C. 350 (1941); Merillat-Purchase, 36 M. C. C. 331
(1941); Hoover Motor Exp. Co.-Purchase, 35 M. C. C. 639 (1940).
99. Union Bus Lines, Inc.-Purchase, 5 M. C. C. 201 (1937).
100. The use of §216(h) in this regard is one of the anomalies in the Commission's
administration of the Act. Section 216(h) provides that in rate proceedings "there shall
not be taken into consideration or allowed as evidence of value of the property of such
carrier, either good will, earning power, or the certificate under which such carrier is
operating." In almost every case where an application has been denied on the basis of
excessive value for intangibles, §216(h) is cited, but with little attempt at explanation.
At the same time in an overwhelming number of approval cases value has been recog-
nized for operating rights upon their transfer, and earning power has been taken into
account.
101. Union Bus-Lines, Inc.-Purchase, 5 M. C. C. 201, 206 (1937).
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In the Transport case the Commission refused to approve an acqui-
sition where the total consideration was only slightly over two times
the value of tangible assets to be acquired. While that decision involved
too many factors to rest squarely on any single point, and in particular
can be partially explained on the lack of arms-length bargaining in
the truest sense,"0 2 the following language of the Commission is very
pertinent:
"We have found that intangible assets and earning power are
not a proper basis for capitalization of rail carriers. . . . There
is even less justification for issue of securities by motor carriers
on the basis of past earnings, as the position of the motor-carrier
industry in the transportation field is not yet fully developed. This
is particularly true in connection with motor-carrier service such as
is here contemplated, much of which would be competitive with
rail and water service, and the earnings from which may be adversely
affected by any change in the rates of competing forms of trans-
portation. . .. Issue of securities to the public on the basis of
past earnings of motor carriers may well lead to financial difficulties
which will adversely affect their credit and ability to furnish ade-
quate service, as well as cause loss to security holders."' 03
The remaining denial cases substantiate the above conclusion that the
two principal grounds for Commission disapproval are excessive pay-
ments for intangible property and increases in an acquiring carrier's
obligations, either of which may impair ability to render adequate motor
carrier service. Where excessive consideration alone has been the basis
of a denial, the acquiring carrier's financial position has usually been
extremely weak and the vendor's property has had a poor earnings
record." Where both grounds exist in a single case disapproval can
be regarded as a foregone conclusion.' The border line cases, however,
are those where the denial rests principally upon increases in fixed
charges, as in Union Bus Lines, Inc.'00 To some extent this single factor
102. That is, the Commission felt that the underwriter, while theoretically the pur-
chaser, was not buying with its own funds but with those of investors and, consequently,
the same restraint was not present as in commonplace vendor-vendee transactions. See
The Transport Co.-Control, 36 M. C. C. 61, 90-91 (1940).
103. The Transport Co.-Control, 36 M. C. C. 61, 91 (1940).
104. Buckingham Transp. Co. of Colo., Inc.-Purchase, 36 M. C. C. 313 (1940f;
Potashnick, Truck Serv., Inc.-Control, 5 M. C. C. 723 (1938); ef. Gray Line Motor
Tours, Inc.-Control, 15 M. C. C. 326 (1933).
105. Hill Bus Co.-Purchase, 36 M. C. C. 250 (1940) ; Pacific Frt. Lines-Purchase,
5 M. C. C. 502 (1938); Kendall-Control, 5 M. C. C. 563 (193) ; cf. Temple-Control,
C. C. H. Fed. Carriers Serv. f7725 (1941). In two other denial cases, the C.mmission
was influenced by improper appraisals of physical properties, Public Serv. Interstate
Transp. Co.-Purchase, 36 M. C. C. 377 (1941), and by impossibility of determining
what was the actual amount of consideration involved, Consulidated Freightways, Inc.-
Lease, 25 M. C. C. 723 (1939).
106. See discussion p. 1402 supra.
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serves to distinguish certain denial cases from the great mass of approval
cases. But that it is not an infallible touchstone is demonstrated by the
several cases already referred to where the Commission has sanctioned
acquisitions involving increases in fixed charges with little or no attempt
at explanation.' 1"
Viewing the denial and approval cases together, it appears that at one
extreme the Commission has firmly denied unification applications where
the consideration proposed for intangibles so clearly impairs the financial
strength of the applicant that continued satisfactory service is dubious.
At the other extreme, where a successful operator seeks to expand by
acquiring new operating rights for a relatively inconsequential amount, or
when an integration contemplates a merely temporary increase in intan-
gible property, Commission consent has been freely given. But between
these extremes there is a comparatively uncharted area of Commission
discretion, characterized before the Transport case perhaps by a tendency
to resolve doubts in favor of the applicant. A few points upon which
a decision may turn have been set forth: the ratio of intangibles to
tangibles in relation to the financial position of the applicant, an increase
in indebtedness as a means of financing an acquisition, public sale of
securities, and across-the-table bargaining. But which way the Com-
mission will go can hardly be predicted with any reliability beyond the
general surmise that the larger the applicant and the acquisition, the
stricter will be the Commission's attitude.
Concededly the Commission is in a sympathy provoking position. To
deny any value on the transfer of intangibles and to guard against
increases in indebtedness too severely will thwart desirable combination.
To permit uncurbed license in valuation of intangible property would
surely produce unifications marked by financial instability and doomed
to eventual insolvency. But the Commission has no corner on the sym-
pathy market, for the carrier desiring to unify, especially on a reasonably
large scale, can obtain little confident advice from the Commission's
decisions. Perhaps the way will be clearer after the Commission has
had further opportunity to distill its own ideas. On the other hand,
it may be that the whole Commission policy is to keep the field open
within broad confines for easier decision of each individual case as it
is presented. Yet one wonders if the ultimate consequence of such a
policy will not be to contribute further to freezing the motor carrier
industry at a stage somewhat near its present level.
Corporate Simplification. The fourth prime factor in the consistency
with the public interest doctrine is the requirement of corporate simpli-
fication, which seeks to prevent the separation of motor carrier control
107. See cases cited notes 19 and 20 supra.
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from operation. 08 If the applicant is a holding company wlich controls
or is a concern controlled by operating companies, its proposal to purchase
or lease property and operating rights of another carrier invites Com-
mission disapproval, or at least approval conditioned on the real party
in interest being substituted as the acquiring company.1 ° Charging that
maintenance of such inter-corporate relationships serves no purpose but
to confuse shippers, increase expenses and complicate regulation, the
Commission has constantly encouraged the creation of simple corporate
structures. Consequently whenever a unification proposal, whether by
purchase, merger, or consolidation, seeks to take advantage of the
economies attendant upon corporate simplification, the Commission is
quick to find consistency with the public interest.10
Another type of situation provoking Commission disapproval on
grounds related to corporate simplification arises where commonly con-
trolled corporate entities operate over duplicate routes.21  This was the
condition in the Transport case which was sought to be remedied by the
supplemental proposal to effect "singleness of title" in the parent com-
pany. The evil of such an arrangement is not alone the needlessly
complex corporate structure, but also the attempt to preserve two sets
of operating rights over an identical route by singly controlled operation.
Such preservation not only prevents economies and improvements in
service incident to complete unification, and provides an opportunity for
unfair competitive practices between apparent competitors, but also per-
mits later separation and use of such rights when competitive conditions
108. Objectionable separation of control from operation may arise through devices
other than corporate affiliates, as, for e-ample, through a lease under which applicant
acquires technical control of lessee's property, but lessor agrees to continue operation
with its employees. Denver-Chicago Trucking Co.-Control, 15 M. C. C. 257 (1933);
Chicago, R. I. & Pac. Ry.-Lease, 15 M. C. C. 161 (1938).
109. Hudson-Bergen Bus Co.-Lease, 25 M. C. C. 632 (1939); Pacific Frt. Lines
Exp.-Purchase, 15 M. C. C. 281 (1938); Dalby Motor FrL Lines, Inc.-Lease, 36 it.
C. C. 302 (1940) ; Hoover Motor Exp. Co., Inc.-Purchase, 25 M. C. C. 719 (1939);
Merchants, Inc.-Purchase, 15 11. C. C. 225 (1938) ; Pennsylvania Truck Lines, Inc.-
Control, 1 M6. C. C. 101 (1936). If two separate types of operations are conducted, sep-
arate entities under common control are permissible. Consolidated Freightays, Inc.-
Control, 36 M. C. C. 358 (1941). Or if corporate simplification would prejudice the posi-
tion of a unified company no corporate simplification will be demanded. American Motor
Transp., Inc.-Purchase, 35 M. C. C. 41 (1939).
110. Johnson Bus Lines, Inc.-IMerger, 15 M. C. C. 221 (1938); Cole Motor Serv.,
Inc.-Merger, 15 M. C. C. 218 (1938); East Tex-as Motor Frt. Lines--Merger, 15 M.
C. C. 1 (1938) ; Keeshin Motor Exp. Co., Inc.-Leases, 1 M. C. C. 373 (1936); Keeshin
Transcon. Frt Lines, Inc.-Control, 1 M. C. C. 317 (1936).
111. Hoover Motor Exp. Co., Inc.-Purchase, 35 M. C. C. 639 (1940); Florman-
Control, 35 If. C. C. 521 (1940); Casaroll-Control, 35 M. C. C. 471 (1940); Younger
Bros., Inc.-Purchase, 25 M. C. C. 137 (1939) ; Interstate Busses Corp. (Conn.)-Pur-
chase, 15 M. C. C. 285 (1938).
112. The Transport Co.-Control, 36 M. C. C. 61, 86 (1940).
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may have been completely altered. For this reason a proposed transaction
which would result in two sets of operating rights over duplicate routes
coming into, the hands of carriers commonly controlled faces certain
disapproval unless merger of the operating rights is carried out.1 ' A
like requirement exists where a single carrier seeks to hold duplicate
operating rights." 4 Similarly, keeping the pattern consistent, applica-
tions to lease duplicate rights from another carrier are denied.110 In all
instances, whatever the unification device, preservation of duplicate rights
has been denounced as inconsistent with the public interest.
To complete the picture of the doctrine of consistency with the public
interest as drawn by the Commission,"' a word must be added about
operation of common carriage in competition with contract or private
carriage when under single control, an arrangement technically labeled
"dual operation." Since it was believed that such dual operation pro-
vided particular opportunity for discrimination against shippers, the
Motor Carrier Act specifically prohibits it unless the Commission "for
good cause shown" shall make a special finding of consistency with
113. See cases cited note 111 supra.
114. A subsequent sale of one set of rights, whether the duplication arose from a
difference in the description in the certificate to operate, or from a purchase of such
rights, or from the difference between performing "through" and "local" operations as
separate service, will not be approved by the Commission. Washington Motor Coach
Co., Inc.-Purchase, 35 M. C. C. 627 (1940); Southwestern Transp. Co.-Purchase,
35 M. C. C. 437 (1940); H. P. Welch Co.-Purchase, 25 M. C. C. 558 (1939). Merger
of duplicate rights is now made a condition to Commission approval of the unification
transaction. However, the doctrine condemning route splitting is not extended to a case
where vendor possesses confirmed operating rights over alternate routes between the
same points. Magee Truck Lines, Inc.-Purchase, 25 M. C. C. 732 (1939).
115. Keeshin Motor Exp. Co., Inc. (Ill.)-Lease, 36 M. C. C. 289 (1940); Patz-
Lease, 35 M. C. C. 113 (1940) ; Consolidated Freightways, Inc.-Lease, 25 M. C. C. 428
(1939); Wilson-Control, 25 M. C. C. 41 (1939); Hawkeye Motor Exp., Inc.-Lease,
15 M. C. C. 456 (1938); Huber-Purchase, 15 M. C. C. 451 (1938).
116. During the early period of regulation, a serious administrative problem was pre-
sented to the Commission by the existence of unifications first consummated and then
submitted for approval. Because honest misunderstanding of the provisions of § 213
was a real possibility, and because the only certain enforcement weapon was to dissolve a
unification which might otherwise be in the public interest, the Commission was at first
very tolerant of previous unlawful operation through unapproved unification. Trans
American Frt. Lines, Inc.-Purchase, 5 M. C. C. 712 (1938); Hancock Truck Lines,
Inc.-Purchase, 5 M. C. C. 405 (1938); Dohrn Transfer Co.-Purchase, 5 M. C. C.
282 (1937); Ziffrin's Overnite Exp., Inc.-Purchase, 5 M. C. C. 246 (1937). How-
ever, in Potashnick Truck Serv., Inc.-Control, 5 M. C. C. 723 (1938), the Commission
published a warning. Since the provisions of the Act were by that time better under-
stood, the time for leniency was said to have expired and future unifications effected
without prior approval were promised prosecution under the general enforcement provi-
sions of the Act which had been expressly extended to § 213 by the 1938 amendments,
or dissolution because prior unlawful operation may in itself make the unification incon-
sistent with the public interest. Buckingham Transp. Co. of Colo., Inc.-Purehase,
36 M. C. C. 313 (1940).
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the public interest.-17 The necessity for this special finding is not obviated
because duality of operation arises from a unification proceeding instead
of from a petition for original authority, and if such a result is a neces-
sary condition to a unification proposal, the application will be denied 18
If, however, the dual operation can be eliminated from the proposal
without destroying its primary purpose, the Commission will approve
the transaction and merely insert a condition against dual operation.""
In the main, the applicable doctrine to unification transactions devel-
oped under former Section 213 was unaffected by the shift of the
statutory provisions to Section 5 (2). It has already been pointed out
that the directions to the Commission contained in new paragraph (c)
of Section 5(2) to consider the effect of the transaction upon adequate
transportation service to the public, and to take into account the total
resulting fixed charges, added nothing to existing Commission policy.
Paragraph (c), however, did introduce an apparently new factor in its
direction to the Commission to consider "the interest of the carrier
employees affected." While the Commission had the power prior to
this express provision to condition its approval of a unification upon
the adoption of a plan affording protection to discharged employees,2 '3
that power had never been exercised in any motor carrier proceeding.
In fact, in many cases reduced employee expense was regarded by the
Commission as an economy in the public interest.'- 1 This new require-
117. MOTOR CAPmER AcT § 210. If the contract and common carriage are not com-
petitive, both may be conducted by a single carrier. Derr-Purchase, 25 M. C. C. 729
(1939).
118. Paxton & DeLair-Purchase, 25 M. C. C. 498 (1939); Scott Bros., Inc.-Con-
trol, 15 M. C. C. 419 (1938); Universal Service, Inc.-Purchase, 15 M. C. C. 247 (1933);
Oldfields Trucking Co.-Purchase, 5 M. C. C. 137 (1937). The objectionable features
incident to dual operations by a single carrier are not obviated by the conduct of such
operations by separate corporations. Ziffrin Truck Lines-Merger, 25 M. C. C. 783
(1939).
Certain carriers to be acquired by the Transport Company were engaged in con-
tract as well as common carrier operations. Because of its decision of the case on other
grounds the Commission failed to make a study of each operation, as did the Examiner,
but it did affirm the principle prohibiting dual operations and stated summarily that, as
no good cause had been shown, control of the contract carriers operating in competition
with common carriers was not consistent with public interest. The Transport Co.-
Control, 36 M. C. C. 61, 80 (1940).
119. Campbell Sixty-Six Exp., Inc.-Purchase, 36 M. C. C. 209 (1940); Penn Ohio
New York Exp. Corp.-Purchase, 35 M. C. C. 305 (1940) ; Hale-Purchase, 15 M. C. C.
126 (1938); Schultz-Purchase, 15 M. C. C. 13 (1938).
120. United States v. Lowden, 308 U. S. 225 (1939).
121. Caplan-Control, 35 M. C. C. 477 (1940); Norwalk Truck Line Co.-Merger,
35 M. C. C. 459 (1940); Gordon Interstate Inc.-Purchase, 15 M. C. C. 30 (1933);
Great So. Trucking Co.-Purchase, 5 M. C. C. 475 (1938); Germann Bros. Motor
Transp., Inc.-Purchase, 5 M. C. C. 469 (1938); Bowen Motor Coaches-Consolida-
tion, 5 M. C. C. 344 (1937); Southeastern Greyhound Lines-Securities, 1 M. C. C.
387 (1936). In some cases employee economy was expressly mentioned, in others it was
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ment in paragraph (c) provides an express basis for a shift in approach,
but the cases decided since it took effect give little indication that such
a shift is forthcoming. Some unification proposals have been approved
where it is clear that some contraction in the number of employees was
contemplated; 122 none have been denied for failure to provide for
affected employees, nor have there been any compulsory plans for such
protection imposed by the Commission. The conflicting stresses are clear.
Since in many cases the principal economy achieved is the elimination
of employees engaged in duplicate functions, the necessity of providing
for those employees may well thwart unifications otherwise in the public
interest. On the other hand, it seems reasonable that employees who
have contributed to the value of an enterprise are entitled to share in
the benefits of unified operation. To these opposing factors must be
added a third, and one which may contain the clue to Commission action
in the immediate future. Since motor carriers, unlike railroads, are
expanding transport agencies, and since unified operation promises to
facilitate that growth and expansion, employee displacement is, at worst,
only a temporary problem.12' All of these considerations were presented
in the Examiner's proposed report in the Transport case, and while the
impairment of employee interest was not found sufficient to warrant
denial of the application, a plan for temporary employee protection was
devised and made a condition to approval. Unfortunately the Commis-
sion's own decision, made on other grounds, prevented treatment of this
question and its answer will remain in doubt until the Commission seeks
to resolve the question more decisively.
THE RAILROAD PROBLEM IN UNIFICATIONS
No problem in motor carrier unification is more fascinating or more
crucial than fixing the role to be played by the railroads. Today their
interest in motor carriage is substantial and constantly growing, and
while its extent is not precisely known, the trend is definitely in the
direction of co-ordinated service between rail and motor carriers.124
implicit in the administrative economies proposed. But in most cases employee savings
are small, and it is scarcely surprising that the Commission failed to consider it a press-
ing problem.
122. Campbell Sixty-Six Exp., Inc.-Purchase, 36 M. C. C. 209 (1940) ; Silver Fleet
Motor Exp., Inc.-Merger, 36 M. C. C. 57 (1940) ; Hayes Frt. Lines, Ine,-Purchase,
36 M. C. C. 8 (1940) ; Heller-Control, 35 M. C. C. 721 (1940).
123. Marshall-Purchase, 36 M. C. C. 33 (1940).
124. In Coordination of Motor Transportation, 182 I. C. C. 263 (1932), Appendix
A, 393-400, the Commission presented figures of railroad interest in motor carriers:
(1) On June 30, 1930, 18 Class I railroads through direct ownership, subsidiary com-
panies, or stock control, operated 551 trucks and 115 trailers, and 34 Class I railroads
operated 3105 busses. In 1927 those railroads operated only 114 trucks, 34 trailers, and
745 busses. (2) On June 30, 1930, Class II railroads operated 8 trucks and 12 busses.
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Co-ordination is theoretically possible in various ways: by means of
co-operative formulation of joint rates and through-routes between com-
pletely independent railroads and motor carriers, 1'- by unification of the
two agencies into large integrated transport companies, or by some com-
promise between these two extremes. Up to the present the Commission
has not prevented integration of rail and motor service because of the
possibility of co-operation. 12  At the same time the policy of the Motor
In 1927 those railroads operated no trucks and 5 busses. (3) Total property investment
of the motor carriers in which railroads had an interest was on December 31, 1929,
$46,114,891.
ICC, Bureau of Statistics (1936), Statement No. 3669, Invesltitcnts of Steam Rail-
ways in Highway Motor Vehicle Enterprises as of May 1, 1936 provides later figures.
Class I railroads then had an interest in 128 highway carrier companies. The aggregate
capitalization, stocks, bonds, and advances, held by the railroads was $43,109,361. On
the other hand, those carrier companies in which railroads had an interest had $59,231,728
in plant and equipment, a marked increase over the 1929 figure above.
According to a survey made in (fay 22, 1937) 102 RAILWAY AcE 879, 78 railroads
operated motor carriers by bus or truck. The railwvays operated 5,210 trucks and Rail-
way Express 12,340.
Annual purchases of motor carrier equipment made by the railroads have shown
constant increases according to surveys made by Railway Age. In 1933, 106 busses,
67 trucks, 2 tractors, 17 trailers, and 37 passenger automobiles were purchased; in 1934,
302 busses, 337 trucks, 27 tractors, 20 trailers, and 45 passenger automobiles were pur-
chased. (Jan. 26, 1935) 98 RAILWAY AGE 168. In 1935 orders were placed for 220
busses, 543 trucks, 106 tractors, 174 trailers and 111 passenger automobiles, and in 1936,
for 738 busses, 1276 trucks, 220 tractors, 234 trailers, and 177 passenger automobiles.
(Jan. 2, 1937) 102 RAILWAY AGE 91-97. In 1937, 771 busses, 1692 units of freight equip-
ment, and 198 automobiles were ordered; and in 1938, 260 busses, 1647 units of freight
equipment, and 164 automobiles were ordered. (Jan. 7, 1939) 106 RAILX,Ay Ace 93-96.
In 1939, 393 busses, 1638 units of freight equipment, and 263 automobiles were purchased;
in 1940, 646 busses, 1934 trucks, 311 tractors, 506 trailers, and 302 automobiles were
purchased. (Jan. 4, 1941) 110 RAILWAY AGE 115. These figures are not meant to be a
complete survey of railroad purchases, but they do demonstrate the trend of increased
activity in the motor carrier field.
According to a private communication from the Bureau of Statistics, a new study
of the extent of railroad interest in motor carriers is now being made and .vill probably
be issued sometime this year.
125. Motor carriers favor this solution, and railroads resist it. A resolution adopted
by the Association of American Railroads on September 20, 1935, as amended by a reso-
lution adopted June 25, 1937, made it the policy of the Association to discourage membr
roads "from establishing with motor carriers through routes or joint rates or fares which
invade territory not served by such railroad and which is already served by one or more
other railroads." This policy vas attacked by the Department of Justice as a violation
of the Sherman Act, and the resolutions were rescinded by Association resolutions adopt-
ed on December 29, 1939, and on or about February 15, 1940. These rescissions were
allegedly made under the agreement that the anti-trust action would be dismissed. The
Department of Justice, however, insisted that a consent decree be issued. The railroads
are contesting this demand on the ground that the question is now moot, and the case
remains in the process of litigation.
126. Kansas City So. Transp. Co., Inc., Common Carrier Application, 28 11. C. C.
5 (1941) ; Rock Island Motor Transit Co.-Purchase, 5 M. C. C. 451, 456 (1938).
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
Carrier Act definitely arrested as of 1935 any movement toward inte-
grated companies controlled by railroads. Evidencing the fear of rail-
road domination of the motor carrier field, Section 5(2) (b) compels
a carrier applicant "controlled by" or "affiliated" with a railroad to meet
more restrictive unification standards than those applied to an ordinary
motor carrier applicant. Not only must it be shown that the transaction
is consistent with the public interest, but also that the acquiring carrier
will be able "to use service by motor vehicle to public advantage in its
operations" and that the acquisition will not unduly restrain compe-
tition.
12 7
The principal objective of this railroad proviso is to prevent the man-
agement of motor carriers in the interest of railroads and to promote
motor carriage as an independent means of transportation.123 Conse-
quently, where the chain of railroad control through stock ownership is
direct, there is no question as to the applicability of the restrictions of
the railroad proviso, even though control is removed by the intervention
of intermediate holding companies. "' The phrase "affiliated" with,
however, is more bothersome, in spite of its definition in the Act as
a relationship because of which "it is reasonable to believe that the
affairs of any carrier of which control may be acquired by such person
will be managed in the interest of such other carrier."'3 0 In interpreting
this definition the Commission has directed its attention toward the
ownership and managerial relationships between the railroad and the
applicant rather than toward the locati6n of the acquired carrier's routes,
which might perhaps seem relevant in view of the definition's am-
biguity.' Whether the applicant is so closely related to a railroad that
127. See p. 1383 supra.
128. See note 25 supra.
129. Pennsylvania Truck Lines, Inc., Acquisition of Control of Barker Motor Freight,
Inc., 1 M. C. C. 101 (1936); Cleveland, Columbus & Cincinnati H'w'y, inc.-Purchase,
5 M. C. C. 479 (1938).
130. INTRSTATE Co maca AcT §5(b). The Motor Carrier Act, §213(a)(1),
referred, for definition of affiliation, to § 5(8) of the Interstate Commerce Act. Although
§ 5(8) has been renumbered § 5(6), the provisions are the same.
131. Suppose an applicant motor carrier is not controlled by a railroad, but is sub-
ject to substantial railroad interest. Whether or not the railroad proviso applies de-
pends upon whether or not there is "affiliation" between the two. Now suppose that the
applicant proposes to purchase a connecting motor carrier which departs from the rail-
road route and taps an area unserved by the railroad. Does this fact prevent the possi-
bility of "management in the interest" of the railroad so as to remove the transaction from
the bite of the proviso because of lack of affiliation? In a dissent to Northland Greyhound
Lines, Inc.-Purchase, 5 M. C. C. 759 (1938), Commissioner Eastman thought it did.
But remoteness from the area served by the railroad is a ground used to deny a pro-
posed acquisition of a motor carrier because remoteness prevents the close coordination
essential to promoting the public interest. For the same fact to be a cause for excluding
the initial applicability of the proviso would defeat its very purpose by permitting car-
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acquired rights and properties will be managed in the interest of the
railroad is a question of fact, and, in determining its existence or non-
existence, stock ownership, common officers and directors, and service
agreements will be given careful consideration. Some railroad interest
in motor carriers is fostered by the Act and by the Commission, 3' but
the point at which such interest becomes affiliation is difficult to mark.
Railroad stock interest in a motor carrier of 12%, 13%, 33%, and even
397o... has been held not to constitute affiliation. On the other hand,
if ownership is approximately equally divided between a railroad and
a motor carrier interest, such joint ownership is usually deemed to be
affiliation."3 4 To demonstrate the importance of considerations other than
stock ownership, there is no better case than Richmond Greyhound Lines,
Inc.,"' where 51% of applicant motor carrier's stock was owned by the
Greyhound Corporation, and 49% by the Richmond, Fredericksburg and
Potomac Railroad. Three of applicant's seven directors, who were also
its vice-president, assistant traffic manager, and auditor, were president
and director, general traffic manager, and general auditor, respectively,
of the railroad. In addition, applicant used the railroad's terminal facili-
ties and its accounting and treasury departments. The proposed acqui-
sition was subjected to the railroad proviso on the ground that the
applicant was affiliated with the railroad. This decision was later reversed
when the relationship had been altered. 30 Although the stock ownership
remained the same, railroad representatives had resigned from offices
in the applicant, and use of railroad terminal facilities, and its accounting
and treasury departments had been terminated.
Assuming that railroad control or affiliation does exist, the applicant
must show that the proposed transaction will be consistent with public
interest and that motor service will be used to public advantage in its
rail operations, or as put in a shorthand phrase by the old Act, will
riers in which railroads had a very substantial interest to expand without regard for
the location of the acquired routes. The majority realized this, and in the Northlard-
Greyhound case attention was carefully restricted to the relationship between the railroad
and the acquiring carrier.
132. The Act's declaration of a policy of fostering coordination and better relations
between motor carriers and other carriers has been understood by the Commission as
intended to encourage rail investment in motor carriers. Northland-Greyhound Lines,
Inc.-Purchase, 25 M. C. C. 109, 111 (1939).
133. National Frt. Lines, Inc.-Purchase, 15 M. C. C. 687 (1939); Cleveland, Colum-
bus, & Cincinnati I-'w'y, Inc.-Purchase, 36 11. C. C. 325 (1941); Southwestern Grey-
hound Lines, Inc.-Purchase, 25 M. C. C. 195 (1939); Riss & Co., Inc.-Purchase, 35
Mf. C. C. 61 (1939).
134. New England Greyhound Lines, Inc.-Purchase, 15 M. C. C. 536 (1938);
Northland-Greyhound Lines, Inc.-Purchase, 5 If. C. C. 215 (1937).
135. Richmond Greyhound Lines, Inc.-Control, 5 I. C. C. 394 (1938). See also E.
T. & W. N. C. 'Motor Transp. Co.-Lease, 5 M. C. C. 196 (1937).
136. Richmond-Greyhound Lines, Inc.-Control, 35 M. C. C. 555 (1940).
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promote the public interest. In any search for the applied content of this
vague criterion, the point of departure must necessarily be the Barker
case around which the governing doctrine has been unfolded."' The
applicant was a motor carrier, controlled by the Pennsylvania Railroad,
which proposed to utilize grandfather rights to be acquired in this pro-
ceeding in the establishment of co-ordinated rail-motor service for its
patrons. Recognizing that in pome respects there were inherent public
advantages in this new form of transportation endeavor, 88 and that it
presented no undue restraint of competition, the Commission expressed
a desire to encourage its widespread adoption. The Commission realized,
however, that, in other respects, the proposed acquisition would have
resulted in the railroad-controlled applicant entering the motor carrier
business as a direct competitor not only of the Pennsylvania Railroad
itself and of established motor carriers, but also of other railroads in
new areas not theretofore served by the Pennsylvania Railroad. The
Commission also recognized that once it permitted acquisition of motor
carrier routes by a railroad, it would be powerless to prevent service
expansion over such routes, and that the great financial strength and
large traffic-soliciting force involved would provide a much more for-
midable threat to competitors than had been provided by motor carrier
predecessors. Faced once again with conflicting desires, the Commission
adopted a compromise position and suspended final disposition for sixty
days, during which period the applicant was permitted to amend its
application and get Commission approval by confining its new opera-
tions to service "auxiliary and supplementary" to that performed by the
Pennsylvania Railroad in its rail operations and in territory parallel and
adjacent to its rail lines. The rationale of its position was clearly set
forth:
. .. we are not convinced that the way to maintain for the
future healthful competition between rail and truck service is to
give the railroads full opportunity to go into the kind of truck
service which is strictly competitive with, rather than auxiliary to,
their rail operations. . . . The financial and soliciting resources
of the railroads could easily be so used in this field that the devel-
opment of independent service would be greatly hampered and
restricted, and with ultimate disadvantage to the public." 13
137. Pennsylvania Truck Lines, Inc., Acquisition of Control of Barker Motor Freight,
Inc., 1 M. C. C. 101 (1936).
138. Id. at 111: "The motor vehicle can undoubtedly be used as a very valuable atxil-
iary or adjunct to railroad service, particularly less-than-carload service, and
the many opportunities for such use here have been pointed out of record and are clear.
Such coordination of rail and motor-vehicle operations should be encouraged. The result
will be a new form of service which should prove of much public advantage."
139. Id. at 111-12.
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A supplemental decision by the Commission in the Barker case,141
issued after consideration of the amended application, presents even more
articulately the permissible scope of railroad operation of motor carriers.
"Approved operations are those which are auxiliary or supple-
mentary to train service. Except as hereafter indicated, nonapproved
operations are those which otherwise compete with the railroad itself,
those which compete with an established motor carrier, or which in-
vade to a substantial degree territory already adequately served by
another rail carrier."' 4'
In general the Commission indicated that the permissible highway route
for auxiliary and supplementary service was the one most closely paral-
leling the railroad except where use of a non-parallel shortcut highway
was dearly in the public interest. Since off-rail points were being other-
wise adequately served, Commission approval was conditioned against
rendering service to any point wlich was not a station on the Pennsyl-
vania Railroad. But a proviso was added that if subsequently it were
shown that service to some point excluded by this condition had become
inadequate, the restriction would be removed.
Back of the decision in the Barker case, of course, is the general
assumption that rail and motor carriers each have their own special
competence." Wasteful operation occurs when either agency leaves that
field of special competence to engage in operation beyond it. Since this
latter practice, which is fairly common today, is a contributing factor to
distress in the transportation industry, one solution is the co-ordination
of rail service with motor service so as to permit each agency to perform
its most efficient function. At least a step in the right direction is made
when railroads make provision for supplementation of rail service by
motor carriage. In the field of less-than-carload freight, where traffic
losses have been especially severe, new horizons are opened by using
trucks to facilitate distribution and to substitute for local peddler-freight
trains. Passenger service likewise can be made more flexible, more
complete, and faster. Economies and service improvements of this type
are all sponsored by the Act,'43 which at the same time seeks to fore-
140. Pennsylvania Truck Lines, Inc.-Control, 5 M. C. C. 9 (1937).
141. Id. at 11-12.
142. Because of relatively high terminal costs for railroads, motor carriers can carry
short hauls more economically than can railroads. As distance increases the terminal
costs may be more widely spread and the net cost for railroad service becomes less than
for motor carriers. Where this distance point, which divides the carriers according to
cost of operations, is reached vill depend on the type of commodity and the route over
which it is hauled. CowcLusioxs ON .ERCH.ANDISE TRFFIC (U. S. Office of the Fed-
eral Coordinator 1936); FRIG]T TRAFFIc REowRT (U. S. Office of the Federal Coordi-
nator 1935) ; Coordination of Motor Transportation, 182 I. C. C. 263 (1932).
143. The Motor Carrier Act, § 202, in its "Declaration of Policy," provided that
regulation shall be administered, among other purposes, "to improve the relations be-
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stall their introduction as a means of railroad penetration of motor
carriage at the expense of independent operators.
44
The decision in the Barker case was a compromise between these con-
flicting policies, and the Commission ever since, with but few minor
modifications, has adhered to its principle of encouraging co-ordinated
rail-motor service provided that the supplementary motor carriage is
closely tied to the railroad tracks. 14 Regardless of when a rail-controlled
motor subsidiary commenced operation, any expansion will be condemned
unless it provides for service auxiliary to the railroad.Y40  Many appli-
cations have been denied because operating rights to be acquired could
not be used in railroad operations ;147 many others have been approved
tween, and coordinate transportation by and regulation of motor carriers and other car-
riers." The Transportation Act of 1940 repealed § 202, and made a "Declaration of
Policy" in more general terms: ". . . all to the end of developing, coordinating, and
preserving a national transportation system by water, highway, and rail." INTERSTATE
COmmERCE Acr § 1.
144. See pp. 1383-85, 1408-1410 supra. Moreover, in the same "Declaration of Policy"
of the Motor Carrier Act, 1935, supra note 143, it is made a purpose of regulation "to
recognize and preserve the inherent advantages of" motor carriage. The Transportation
Act of 1940 adopts the same language and makes it applicable to all carriers. These con-
flicting statements of policy, and the conflicting provisions for regulation, make it virtually
impossible to determine whether the Congressional goal is to maintain independent fully
competitive transportation systems or whether it is to provide an articulated or coordi-
nated system of transportation in which the separate media would tend to lose their
identity. LYON, ABRAmSON & AssocIATEs, 2 GOVERNMENT AND ECONOMIC LIFE (1940)
842.
145. Among the Commissioners, Mr. Eastman is probably the most vigorous proponent
of rail-motor coordination. Carrying back to the Commission views crystalized from
his work as Federal Coordinator, he stated, in a special concurrence to Union Pac. R. R.
-Control, 15 M. C. C. 101, 108 (1938): "I believe very strongly in the use of motor-
trucks in coordination with rail operations, and that they can be so used to much ad-
vantage in providing a less costly, more flexible, and more convenient service." See
also note 142 supra.
146. However, a motor carrier subsidiary of a railroad may continue operations in
a territory not served by the railroad directly if those operations were begun before the
effective date of the Act. But such a carrier may make no new acquisitions under § 5 (2)
which provide service apart from the rail service.
147. On January 1, 1941, nineteen denials had been made by the Commission be-
cause an applicant owned by or affiliated with a railroad failed to show that the acquisi-
tion would enable it to use motor service to public advantage in rail operations, or that
the acquisition would not unduly restrain competition. See note 168 infra. Illustrative
of the various factors involved in denials on the former ground are C. W. Motor Lines,
Inc.-Purchase, 35 M. C. C. 103 (1940) ; Scott 'Bros., Inc.-Control, 15 M. C. C. 419
(1938); Santa Fe Trails of Ill., Inc.-Control, 15 M. C. C. 347 (1938); Northland
Greyhound Lines, Inc.-Purchase, 5 M. C. C. 759 (1938) ; Interstate Transit Lines
(Nebraska) -Purchase, 5 M. C. C. 369 (1938). See also Mobile & Ohio Transp. Co.
of II1.-Control, 36 M. C. C. 391 (1941), where the Commission held that the proposed
service, since it would only enable the railroad to offer the public the option of travel-
ing by rail or bus, was not auxiliary or supplementary to train service, and hence was
not a use of motor service to public advantage in rail operations.
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because the operating rights have been so located as to be auxiliary to
the railroad and between-points on the rail line. 4 Other acquisitions
have been approved where the route to be acquired is auxiliary to the
rail line but also serves off-rail stations which are not otherwise ade-
quately served, 49 or where, even though the route to be acquired is
not strictly auxiliary to the rail line, it provides a shortcut."" Possible
undue restraint of competition is carefully watched, although in the
absence of an acquisition of rights which will duplicate those already
possessed by the railroad subsidiary,'5' such undue restraint is not likely
to be found.'
52
Modification of the Barker case doctrine has occurred in two respects.
In Santa Fe Trail Stages, ItcY1 r the Commission approved a proposal
made by a railroad subsidiary to acquire a route which was neither
parallel nor adjacent to the parent railroad. The route, however, served
virgin territory. This fact, said the Commission, made the acquisition
comparable to the construction of a branch or feeder railroad line into
new territory and hence auxiliary and supplementary to its rail opera-
tions. With this case as a precedent, the concept of "permissive terri-
tory" has since been expanded to include areas which are served by other
common carriers, but where the service is inadequate. r1
The second modification of the Barker case doctrine is not so clear-
cut. In the Barker case it was specifically stated that if the "transporta-
tion facilities" of an off-rail point were subsequently shown to be in-
148. Both freight and passenger motor carriage have been so approved. Examples
of the former are Gulf Transp. Co.-Purchase, 35 M. C_ C. 699 (1940) ; Pacific Motor
Trucking Co.-Control, 35 M. C. C. 353 (1940); Texas & Pac. Motor Transp. Co.-
Purchase, 5 M. C. C. 653 (1938); Pacific Motor Trucking Co.-Control, 5 M. C. C.
302 (1937) ; of the latter, Burlington Transp. Co.-Purchase, 35 M. C. C. 401 (1940) ;
Gulf Transp. Co.-Purchase, 35 Ml. C. C. 74 (1940); Gulf Transp. Co.-Purchase, I M.
C. C. 117 (1936).
149. Frisco Transp. Co.-Purchase, 35 M. C. C. 132 (1940) ; Maine Central Transp.
Co.-Purchase, 5 l. C. C. 745 (1938); Norfolk So. Bus Corp.-Purchase, 5 M. C. C.
707 (1938).
150. Frisco Transp. Co.-Purchase, 35 M. C. C. 132 (1940); Missouri Pac. Frt.
Transp. Co., 15 M. C. C. 269 (1938); Rio Grande Motor Way, Inc.-Purchase, 5 M.
C. C. 643 (1938).
151. Union Pac. R. RK-Control, 15 M. C. C. 101 (1938); Santa Fe Trail Transp.
Co.-Purchase, 5 M. C. C. 115 (1937); Boston & Mfaine Transp. Co.-Purchase, 5 NI.
C. C. 101 (1937); Union Pac. Stages, Inc.-Purchase, 5 M. C. C. 63 (1937).
152. Northern Pac. Transp. Co.-Purchase, 15 MI. C. C. 296 (1940); Burlington
Transp. Co.-Purchase, 35 M. C. C. 401 (1940); Maine Cent. Transp. Co.-Purchase,
5 Mf. C. C. 745 (1938); Santa Fe Trail Stages, Inc.-Control, 5 M. C. C. 17 (1937).
153. Santa Fe Trail Stages, Inc.-Control, 1 Af. C. C. 225 (1936).
154. Yreka WV. R. Co.-Purchase, 35 M. C. C. 337 (1940); Black Hills Stages, Inc.
-Purchase, 25 M. C. C. 171 (1939); Northern Pac. Transp. Co.-Purchase, 15 M. C. C.
296 (1938); Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co.-Purchase, 5 M. C. C. 127 (1937) ; Santa Fe
Trails Stages, Inc.-Control, 1 M. C. C. 225 (1936); cf. Santa Fe Trails of Ill., Inc.-
Control, 15 11. C. C. 347 (1938).
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adequate, the restriction against service by the rail-controlled motor
carrier could then be lifted. Likewise, in other cases, it was reasonably
held that an off-rail point, within ten miles of the rail line and on a
route parallel thereto, which was inadequately served at the time of the
original application, could be served as if it were a station on the rail-
road. 55 Somewhere in the course of the cases, however, inadequacy of
existing service as a condition precedent disappeared and now apparently
any point within ten miles of the railroad track and on a parallel route
may be served.'56
The effectiveness of restrictions upon railroad acquisitions of motor
carriers would be seriously impaired if at least equal restrictions were
not imposed when railroads or their motor carrier subsidiaries apply
either for new motor carrier certificates of public convenience and
necessity or for extensions to certificates already enjoyed. Consequently,
it is not surprising to find that in the certificate cases the Commission
has permitted only such motor service as is closely co-ordinated with rail
operations. 57 Indeed, in the leading certificate case, Kansas City Southern
Transport Co., 58 the Commission, in granting an extension of the appli-
cant's certificate, conditioned its approval not only by requiring that
motor service be auxiliary to rail service and that it be restricted to
155. Frisco Transp. Co.-Purchase; Maine Cent. Transp. Co.-Purchase; Norfolk
So. Bus Corp.-Purchase all cited supra note 149; cf. Rock Island Motor Transit Co.,
Purchase, 5 M. C. C. 629 (1938); Santa Fe Trail Stages, Inc.-Control, 5 M. C. C.
17 (1937).
156. Santa Fe Transp. Co.-Purchase, 5 M. C. C. 1 (1937); Motor Transp. Co.-
Purchase, 5 M. C. C. 570 (1938); Rock Island Motor Transit Co.-Purchase, 5 M. C.
C. 629 (1938); Frisco Transp. Co.-Purchase, 35 M. C. C. 255 (1940); Pacific Motor
Trucking Co.-Control, 35 M. C. C. 353 (1940). See also Frisco Transp. Co.-Pur-
chase, 25 M. C. C. 604, 608 (1939), where, in approving acquisitions from two indi-
viduals, Scofield and Vicory, the Commission said, "In view of the fact that points on
Scofield's route not stations on the railroad are served by no other rail or motor car-
rier, and that points on Vicory's route not stations on the railroad are not more than 8
miles from such a station, a condition imposing service restrictions with respect to either
transaction is not warranted."
157. The basis for such restrictions in the certificate cases under § 207 (a) is not
that the rail carrier will be enabled to use motor service to public advantage in its rail
operations (the § 5(2) requirement), but simply the public need for the proposed ser-
vice. See Santa Fe Trail Stages, Inc. Common Carrier Application, 21 M. C. C. 725,
753 (1940), rehearing denied by full Commission on January 6, 1941; Kansas City So.
Transp. Co., Inc. Common Carrier Application, 10 M. C. C. 221, 238 (1938); St. An-
drews Bay Transp. Co. Extension of Operations, 3 M. C. C. 711, 715 (1937). Where
public need has been shown, a railroad has been permitted to depart from its line by
means of motor carrier subsidiaries where a new route provided a short-cut or a feeder
line to territory not otherwise served. Santa Fe Trail Stages, Inc., supra; St. Andrews
Bay Transp. Co., supra. As stated in the text, a similar condition is present in unifica-
tion cases by way of exception to the Barker case doctrine.
158. Kansas City So. Transp. Co., Inc. Common Carrier Application, 10 M. C. C.
221 (1938).
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stations on the rail line, but also by requiring that shipments transported
be limited to those received from or delivered to the railroad under
through bills of lading covering prior or subsequent movement by rail.1
Though this last condition was often invoked in later cases,C§ its validity
has been virtually destroyed by reason of its deletion upon a reopening
and amendment of the original Kansas City Southern Transport Co.
case on January 24, 1941.61 The persuasive reason for this deletion was
that the requirement of prior or subsequent movement by rail prevented
way-freight trains from being completely replaced by more efficient and
more economical motor carriage. The Commission, however, did qualify
this deletion by specifically prohibiting the use of motor truck service
between certain key points on the ground that the haul was sufficiently
long to make rail service more efficient than truck service.'6 - This decision
undoubtedly narrows the difference between conditions imposed on co-
ordination in cases involving original certificates or extensions and those
involving unifications,"0 3 but since the key point limitation is invoked in
159. Naturally, this last condition is applicable only to motor carriage of freight. A
contention that a similar condition should be imposed in a unification proposal under
§ 5(2) was expressly denied by the Commission in Pacific Motor Trucking Co.-Control,
35 I. C. C. 353 (1940).
160. Indiana R. R. Ext-Fort Wayne via Muncie, 27 MI. C. C. 176 (1940) ; Louisiana,
A. & T. Ry. Common Carrier Application, 92 M. C. C. 213 (1940) ; Indiana R. R. Ext.
-Fort Wayne, 21 1. C. C. 73 (1939); Pacific Motor Trucking Co. Common Carrier
Application, 21 M. C. C. 761 (1940); Great No. Ry. Ext., 19 M. C. C. 745 (1939);
Chicago, R. I. & Pac. Ry. Ext.-Iowa, Mo., Kan., and Neb., 19 M. C. C. 702 (1939);
Seaboard A. L. Ry. Motor Operation-Gaston--Garnett, S. C., 17 M. C. C. 413 (1939) ;
Texas & Pac. 'Motor Transp. Co. Ext.-Big Spring-Pecos, Te., 14 M. C. C. 649
(1939); Illinois Cent. R. R. Common Carrier Application, 12 f. C. C. 485 (1939);
Texas & Pac. Motor Transp. Co. Common Carrier Application-Louisiana, 10 M. C. C.
525 (1938).
161. Kansas City So. Transp. Co., Inc. Common Carrier Application, 28 M. C. C. 5
(1941). The decision created loud lamentation in the truck industry which proclaimed
that the railroads had been given complete authority to take over the trucking com-
panies. Editorial, Order to Invade, and leading story with banner headlines, I. C. C.
Opens Trucking Field to Rails, Transport Topics, Feb. 24, 1941, Vol. 15, No. 22, p. 1.
Compare Editorial (March 22, 1941) 110 RAILwAY AGE 532, expressing satisfaction
that the railroads had successfully resisted motor truck pressure to compel railroads to
use independent trucking concerns in coordinated operation.
It appears, however, that the requirement of prior or subsequent movement by rail
will still be utilized under certain circumstances. Recently, the Commission granted
temporary authority to the Railway Express Agency (railroad owned) to operate over
63 routes in 22 states, thereby enabling railroads to handle less-than-carload freight
more efficiently. The authority was conditioned on the service being "auxiliary to and
supplementary of" railway express service and on the traffic having an "immediately
prior or immediately subsequent rail movement by the agency." Transport Topics, May
26, 1941, Vol. 15, No. 35, p. 1.
162. Kansas City So. Transp. Co., Inc. Common Carrier Application, 28 M. C. C.
5, 11 (1941).
163. The Kansas City Southern case also narrowed the difference between consid-
erations for certification and unification with respect to effect on competition, the Com-
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the former class of cases, in addition to the Barker case limitations, the
policy against widespread rail invasion of the motor carrier filed ex-
pressed in Section 5 (2) seems adequately protected from circumvention
104
A SURVEY OF COMMISSION ACTIVITY
During 1936, the first full year of Commission supervision over motor
carriage, 122 applications for authority to unify under Section 213 were
filed with the Commission. Since that time, however, the number of
applications filed annually with the Commission has been considerably
larger: 286 in 1937, 214 in 1938, 305 in 1939, and 314 in 1940."'0
The total number of applications filed as of November 1, 1940, when the
last Annual Report of the Commission was issued, was 1,241, and at
least 1,014 of these applications had received disposition.,;
Of this total number of dispositions, 46 were dismissed by the Com-
mission for lack of jurisdiction, and only 48, or less than 5%, were
denied on their merits. 1 7 Twenty-nine of the applications denied involved
mission stating: "It was further found, and properly we think, that the development
of the coordinated service would not seriously endanger the operations of existing motor
carriers, but that, in any event, the public ought not to be deprived of the benefit of anl
improved service merely because it might divert some traffic from other carriers, point-
ing out that had that principle been followed no motor carrier service could have been
developed." (Italics supplied). Commissioner Lee dissented on this question, charging
that Commission disregard for the necessity for added service and its effect on competi-
tion made it easier for railroads than for independent truckers to meet the requirements
of public convenience and necessity.
164. The relevance of such considerations to passenger transportation by bus is a
problem not to be explored here. Certainly rail-controlled bus companies have been
able to add new routes to those owned in 1935 when the Motor Carrier Act became
effective, and they have maintained through bus schedules between key points so that
rail travel for part of a journey, while possible, is not necessarily involved. A good
example is the through service offered by Santa Fe Trailways, controlled by the Atchi-
son, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway, from Chicago to Los Angeles and San Francisco, the
history of which is outlined in Santa Fe Trail Stages, Inc. Common Carrier Applica-
tion, 21 M. C. C. 725 (1940). Such a system, however, by reason of its coordiuated
rail and bus schedules all along its routes and its connecting and feeder lines, does pro-
vide a coordinated rail and bus service as well as independent bus carriage of tile type
in the foregoing example. On the other hand it is clear that an acquisition will not be
approved which has no consequence other than to enable a rail carrier to offer the pub-
lic the option of traveling by either rail or bus. Mobile & Ohio Transp. Co. of IIl,-
Control, 36 M. C. C. 391 (1941).
165. 50th ANN. REP. I. C. C. (1936) 80; 51st ANN. REP. I. C. C. (1937) 77; 52d
ANN. REP. I. C. C. (1938) 98; 53d ANN. REP. I. C. C. (1939) 112; 54th ANN. REP'.
I. C. C. (1940) 111.
166. Ibid.
167. The denials and dismissals are counted only up to November 1, 1940, so as to
make them comparable to the latest official figure available for total applications filed
and dispositions made. In appraising these figures it must be remembered that many
cases have arisen in which the application has been approved, but the approval has re-
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unification of one independent motor carrier with another, and the re-
maining 19 involved an applicant railroad or a motor carrier owned by
or affiiated with a railroad. 6" The astonishingly small number of denials
makes it clear that obstacles to unification imposed by the Act, and its
administration by the Commission, are by no means insuperable. The
contrary is true, since authority for one independent motor carrier to
unify with another will be granted almost as a matter of course if the
consideration involved is reasonable, if no preservation of duplicate rights
is contemplated, and if dual operation is not involved. On the other
hand, when a railroad or a motor carrier owned by or affiliated with a
railroad seeks to acquire further properties, the cases show the effect of
the added restrictions imposed by the Act, in that the 19 denials of such
acquisitions constitute a larger proportion of the applications filed than
do the 29 denials of proposals made by independent motor carriers.
Even though doctrinal requirements incident to a combination of two
independent motor carriers are easily met, the necessity for Commission
approval in itself is probably a damper upon unification transactions, and
since the Resler case it is clear that no unification transaction is entirely
quired consideration to be scaled down or has been conditioned against the preservation of
duplicate routes or dual operation.
168. CommissIoN DENIALS OF APPLICATIONS FOR UNIFICATION
AmoNG INDEPENDENT MOTOR CARRIERS.
Grounds for Number of
Denial. Denials.
Preservation of duplicate rights by a single operation,
or by operation conducted by commonly controlled
corporations ....................................... 12
Excessive consideration .............................. 6
Dual operations ...................................... 3
Undue restraint upon competition .................... 3*
Division of responsibility to the public ................ 2
Failure to show consistency with the public interest .... 2
Joint control over the acquisition ..................... 1
29
* Two were later reversed.
COmmISSION DENIALS OF APPLICATIONS FOR UNIFICATION BETWEEN
A MOTOR CARRIER AND A RAILROAD OR A MOTOR CARRIER
OWNED BY OR AFFILIATED WITH A RAILROAD.
Grounds for Number of
Denial Denials.
Route to be acquired failed to comply with the Barker
case requirements that it be auxiliary, parallel, and
limited to stations on the rail line .................. 14
Undue restraint of competition ........................ 3
Division of responsibility to the public ................ 1
Joint control over the acquisition .................... 1
19
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free from Commission supervision. The procedure incident to approval
is expensive and slow. The expense of filing applications, appearing at
hearings, and employing counsel can hardly be viewed with equanimity
by a small operator who wants to buy out John Jones for $300, but
the necessary delay is of more vital importance to large and small oper-
ators alike. A survey of reported cases shows that the time which
elapsed between formal submission of an application and its disposition
averaged 7 months in 1936, 10 months in 1937, almost 13 months in
1938, 8 months in 1939, and 7 months in 1940.1c9 An average time
of 7 months does not seem alarmingly long for the working of admin-
istrative process, but it is certainly long enough for the occurrence of
important changes in conditions. Equipment tinder contract of sale,
thereby released from the restraint of ownership, can be irremediably
injured in 7 months; patrons may be so neglected as to impair good-
will; a new competitor may be given authority to operate, and rates
may be forced down or wages up. Of these possible adversities only
injury to equipment may be avoided by contract stipulation. There can
be little doubt that delay has caused many an operator, and many a
banker, to turn away from otherwise attractive unification opportunities.
On the other hand, orderly administration of the Act seems to demand
supervision over all unifications, and some delay is a necessary incident.
Such delay, however, should be reduced as much as possible, and this
the Commission seems endeavoring to do.
Questions not only of interest but of important implication, which
apparently have never been thoroughly investigated, are those relating to
the scope of the unifications which are now being made. Are most
acquiring carriers large, or are they small? Are the carriers acquired
small, or are large systems being linked together full-grown? Does the
trend in truck unification differ in these respects from that in bus uni-
fication ?"70 In the hope that answers to these questions might be found
169. In making this survey, only unification cases were used, and applications were
classified according to the nearest month. Omissions occurred because some cases failed
to state the date of original application, and others, involving supplementary reports,
failed to make clear when the petition for amendment or reconsideration was filed. Where
there were more than one application, or where there were amended applications, tile
date of the earliest application was adopted.
It will be noted that the average time increases with the volume of work until 1938.
After that year, however, the average time decreases in spite of all increase in the vol-
ume of work handled. This expedition is probably due more to increased facility by the
Bureau of Motor Carriers than to procedural simplifications introduced by the amend-
ments of 1938, for even though hearings are no longer required they continue to be held
in "nearly every case." AT"'y GEN's Coma. oN ADMw. Psoc.: ADMINISTRATIVE PRO-
CEDURE IN GOVERNMENT AGENCIES, Pt. 11, (Interstate Commerce Commission) 79-81.
170. It was also thought that a picture of unification activity might disclose marked
geographical variations, but geographic classification proved extremely difficult because
rigid boundaries cannot satisfactorily be drawn and because routes acquired are often
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from the cases, those decided in 1940 were examined and appraised.
Unfortunately, the data appearing in the reports was too scanty for en-
tirely satisfactory analysis and comparison. Only seldom was the number
of carriers owned by either party, or involved in the transaction stated.
Balance sheets were outlined, but generally with insufficient particularity
to warrant write-downs. Consequently, for purchase cases the stated
gross assets of the acquiring carrier were used as the criterion of its
size, and the consideration agreed upon was used as the criterion for the
size of the acquisition. This pattern breaks down partially in lease cases,
where the total lease consideration was employed to estimate the size
of the acquisition, and breaks down entirely in merger cases where no
monetary consideration is transferred. In merger cases the stated gross
value of the assets of all parties to the unification were used to determine
their respective size.1 Truck unifications classified in this survey num-
ber 147, of which 111 acquisitions were made by carriers with assets of
more than $50,000 and less than $500,000.' - Twelve carriers with assets
rambling in character. Consequently, 29 of 169 transactions were classified as inter-
regional. Of the remainder, the Northwest had fewest with 8 and the Pacific Coast
next with 12. This low figure for the Pacific Coast is probably because many transac-
tions involving west coast concerns were unifications with carriers operating east of
the Rockies, and consequently classed as inter-regional. The Northeast had 26, the South-
east had 28, the Southwest had 26, and the Mid-West had 41. The predominance of unifi-
cation in the Mid-West is at least partly due to the inclusion in that area of a large
number of important states: Illinois, Missouri, Kansas, Ioma, .Minnesota, Wisconsin,
Michigan, Ohio, and Indiana.
171. There were 9 consolidations with the pro-forma balance sheet of the new cor-
porations showing, in round figures, the following gross assets: (1) '270,000 (2 trucking
companies) ; (2) $65,000 (2 trucking companies) ; (3) $136,000 (2 trucking companies) ;
(4) $200,000 (3 trucking companies); (5) $146,000 (3 bus companies); (6) $577,000
(3 trucking companies); (7) $60,000 (3 trucking companies); (8) $450,000 (2 bus
companies); (9) $124,000 (trucking companies).
172. It should be noted that the chart presented here does not include those transac-
tions excluded from the unification provisions because fewer than 20 vehicles were in-
volved, or because only intrastate rights were acquired, or, because, for any other reason,
Commission jurisdiction was absent.
TRUCKS
Size of 10 1$10,000 25,000 1 50,000 1 100,000 200,001 500,009 11,000,000
Acquiring to to I to I to I to I t to I and
Carrier 10,000125,000 150,000 I 100,000 1200.000 500.000 1,000.00t over 1 Totals
0-$10000 1 1
10000 to 25000 1 1
25000 to 50000 16 1 is
50000 to 100,000 21 7 1 131
100,000 to 200,000 28 7 4 3 I 1 144
200,000 to 500,000 19 12 2 2 I 1 I I3
500,000 to 1,000,000 5 4 1, 1 11 12
1,000,000 and over 3 1 I I_ 1 ! 4
Totals 196 1 341 81 6 1 l 2 1 1 147
1941] 1421
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
of more than $500,000 and less than $1,000,000, and four carriers with
more than $1,000,000 in assets acquired new properties, while, at the
other extreme, only two carriers with assets of less than $25,000 made
acquisitions. Of the total of 147 transactions, 96 involved consideration
of an expenditure of less than $10,000, 34 involved between $10,000
and $25,000, and only 17 more than $25,000.
Only 22 bus acquisitions were found for classification, 7  and ten of
the 22 transactions concerned an acquiring carrier with assets of more
than $1,000,000. However, all of the ten acquisitions were purchased
for less than $50,000, and seven for less than $10,000. Of the 22 trans-
actions, 17 acquiring carriers had assets of more than $200,000, and
only two had assets of less than $100,000. The size of the acquisition
shows more correspondence to truck unifications, for 18 acquisitions were
made for less than $25,000, and 13 for less than $10,000.
This survey is not presented as a completely accurate appraisal of the
magnitude of unification transactions, but it does seem to be indicative
of certain broad trends. Truck unifications are numerous and are being
made predominantly by middle-sized concerns, with only slight activity
among the very large and the very small companies. The number of bus
unifications is smaller, but the acquiring bus companies tend to be larger
than the acquiring truck companies. Both of these results were to be
expected, since the bus industry is far more integrated and mature than
the truck industry. 174 On the other hand, in contrast to these differences
between bus and truck unification, there is also a striking parallel in that
the carriers acquired by both are small in size. The growth into systems,
if there is such a growth, has been proceeding very slowly, and acceler-
ated systematization by large scale acquisitions will probably remain,
since the Transport case, only a possibility of the future.
BUSSES
Size of 0 j$10,000 25,000 1 50,000 100,000 1200,000 500,000 I1,000,0001
Acquiring to to I to I to to [ to to I and
Carrier 1$10,000 25,000 150,000 100,000 200,000 500,000 1,000,000 over I Totals
0 to $10000 I I I i
10000 to 25000
25000 to 50000 1 1
50000 to 100,000 1 1
100,000 to 200,000 2 1 3
200,000 to 500,000 1 2 1 1 5
500,000 to 1,000,000 2 j 2
1,000,000 and over 7 1 2 1 10
Totals 1 13 ! 512 1 _ 1 1 1 22
173. See chart in note 172 supra.
174. Compare the present situation with that in 1932, as set forth in Coordination of
Motor Transportation, 182 I. C. C. 263, 276 (1932), where the Commission said: "High-
,way trucking is organized on the basis of a large proportion of small and medium-sized
operators and a small number of large ones. There are none of a size or territorial ex-
tent comparable with that of the largest bus operators, as discussed below. The tendency
toward consolidation is far less noticeable in the case of truck than of bus lines."
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The extent to which this relatively slow growth into systems and
virtual absence of large-scale unification is attributable to federal regula-
tion under the Motor Carrier Act of 1935 cannot be defined with cer-
tainty. Casual factors in Commission policy may be a combinatisin tnf
the view that small scale operation is most efficient with the view that
motor carrier companies independent of other transportation agencies
are essential for industrial good-health. But it may be that the Ce ,m-
mission has deliberately avoided open espousal of any hrttad policy p,,si-
tion and is temporarily content to apply a brake tn t~tI rapid co mbination
of motor carriers into large concerns. This is particularly evident in
terms of the doctrine developed as a rationale for its policy in the denial
and qualified approval cases. Despite the fact that approval has been
freely granted to the bulk of unification transactions, it is entirely ptssible
that the consequence of the present Commission point of view, if main-
tamined without change, will be to freeze motor carriage development at
some point not far above its present level.
